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ABSTRACT 
On December 9, 1905, newspapers announced the French Third Republic had passed the 
Law on the Separation of the Churches and the State. This law dissolved the complex relationship 
that had existed between the French state and the Catholic Church and ended the public role of 
religion. However, while religious conviction seemed to be on the wane within the French 
metropole, public discourse in the early twentieth century regarding the impending French seizure 
of Morocco consistently referred to the French populace as “Christians” while the Moroccans were 
collectively labeled as “Muslim savages.” This thesis argues that the French media, government, 
and other public figures generated the concept of a “Christian France” in order to underline the 
moral and civilizational superiority of a supposedly unified French civilization in relation to the 
inhabitants of Morocco. 
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     1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Assimilation is impossible in Islamic countries…for there is a fundamental dissimilarity between 
the Muslim and the Christian.”1 Réginald Kann, 1921 
 
On December 9, 1905, French newspapers announced that the Third Republic had passed 
the Law on the Separation of the Churches and the State. This law, publicly hailed by contempo-
raries as “most beneficial to the productive, modern country,” dissolved the complex relationship 
that had existed between the French state and the Catholic Church, ending the public role of reli-
gion and terminating all interaction between the government and religious institutions.
 2
 After dec-
ades of debate and conflict, France had become a secular republic, meaning that the French gov-
ernment no longer acknowledged any religion and that the claims of all religious communities were 
to be confined to private spheres of influence.
3
 The separation was intended to secure the alle-
giance of individuals to the republic and, in so doing, break the political and ideological power that 
had been held by the Catholic Church for centuries. 
 In claiming, “the state does not recognize…any religion,” the law reinforced the notion that 
the French public sphere was to be free from religious persuasion.
4
 While religion—particularly 
Catholicism—undoubtedly remained important to many people within France during this period, 
language in newspapers and other forms of print media suggests that there was a strong sense of 
rupture and a fear of impending societal change amongst contemporaries in regards to the separa-
tion. 
                                                          
1
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However, many individuals in France reacted positively to the new law. Catholic influence 
in the public sphere, according to the prominent Parisian newspaper Le Matin, had been “sowing 
discord” within France, and the relegation of religion to people‟s interior lives was sure to be a 
powerful “instrument of peace” throughout the country.5 Many French people believed that France 
would not enjoy the fruits of democracy until religious influence was rooted out of civic life.
6
 De-
spite this attitude, religious language continued to permeate public discussion in the years following 
the Law of Separation, particularly in relation to France‟s colonies. In fact, early twentieth-century 
print media, literature, and government documents frequently alluded to a dichotomy based large-
ly on religious affiliation that the French constructed between themselves and North African inhab-
itants, particularly the Moroccans. In other words, although many French writers during this time 
extolled France‟s new, established secularism, they simultaneously drew upon the centuries-old 
religious rivalry that set the “French Christians” against the “barbaric Muslims;” this time specifical-
ly in regards to the Kingdom of Morocco.
7
 Although this dichotomous relationship between Chris-
tianity and Islam had been well established within French discourse, its continued use after the 
Law of Separation requires additional study. Even though French Catholics were also distinguished 
from French Jews and Protestants during this period, this study focuses on the comparison be-
tween the French Christians and Moroccan Muslims after the Law of Separation, for the colonial 
context permits a more multifaceted understanding of French religious identity.   
At its core, my thesis examines the paradoxical ways in which the French people identified 
themselves in relation to Christianity both within France and regarding the people of Morocco dur-
ing the years 1900 to 1914. Depending on the context, religion was used in early twentieth-century 
public discourse to exclude or include, to embrace or to define an “other.” After surveying the 
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outward division between the French secular republicans and Catholics during this period in 
France‟s history, my research contends that the institutions of secular republicanism and the 
Church were not as mutually exclusive as current scholarship suggests, for both secularists and 
Catholics invoked similar language and moral ideals to accomplish dissimilar ends.  
Building upon this morally-based unity that existed between Catholics and secularists within 
late nineteenth and early twentieth-century French discourse, the work asserts that public figures 
writing about the Moroccan situation fashioned a unified French Christian colonial identity that 
resonated with the French populace. Interestingly, this constructed “Christian” identity was strongly 
intertwined with French views of “moral” sexuality in relation to the Moroccan people. By viewing 
sexuality through an explicitly religious lens in the French-Moroccan context, the work attempts to 
understand the ways in which perceptions about Arab sexuality in relation to religion were used to 
justify and legitimate French interference in Morocco. Finally, and most importantly, this thesis 
proposes that the French populace‟s rhetorical interactions with the Moroccans both shaped and 
revealed the changing nature of French Christianity after the Separation of Church and State in 
1905. 
Through my research, I intend to make a few broader claims. Firstly, French writers, jour-
nalists, and government officials created the notion of a unified “Christian France” in order to di-
minish the credibility of the Moroccans and ideologically justify French interactions in Morocco. 
My research simultaneously reveals the discursive ties that still existed between the French people 
and Catholicism after 1905. Secondly, the work will uncover the mutual influences between 
metropole and colony and unpack the ways that power was exercised through the overlapping dis-
courses of morality, sexuality, and religion. Thirdly, I will argue that the Law of Separation was not 
as definitive as current scholarship suggests while also showing the ways in which the law—in con-
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junction with France‟s endeavors in Morocco—impacted and changed what it meant to be a French 
Christian in the early twentieth century.  
Now, the question presents itself: How did the French populace‟s interactions with the Mo-
roccan peoples in the early twentieth century (mostly through newspapers and other forms of print 
media) reflect and even shape French religious identity within the metropole? And further: What 
do these interactions in the formative years of the Moroccan protectorate tell us about the broader 
tensions between religion and secularization within French society in the twentieth century? The 
best way to go about answering these questions is to first ask: Why Morocco? What about Moroc-
co had such significance in the French collective imagination during the first years of the twentieth 
century?  
Morocco was consistently headline news in early twentieth-century French media because 
of its political, economic, and cultural importance to France and Europe during the period. Alt-
hough every interested power in Europe—whether it was Britain, France, Germany, or Spain—saw 
Morocco as a key to controlling commerce and politics in the Mediterranean, France was not only 
looking for economic and political gain, but was also seeking a patriotic bridge after the divisive 
years of the Dreyfus Affair.
8
 Outward expansion had the potential to smooth over the internal 
complexities and surface-level divisions caused by religion in France. Also, it is crucial to remem-
ber that the situation surrounding the impending Moroccan protectorate was at the forefront of 
public discussion among the French populace during a time in which religion was being reevaluat-
ed and its role reconsidered within France.  
Because the French looked to Morocco as a potential unifying force during a time when 
questions over the place of religion in society (specifically Catholicism) were causing division, look-
ing at issues of religion and France‟s colonial endeavors in Morocco together enables us to see the 
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ways in which they influenced each other. Sociologist Emile Durkheim, commenting on the reli-
gious climate of early twentieth-century France stated in 1914, “the old ideals and divinities…no 
longer respond sufficiently to the new aspirations of our day…Thus we find ourselves in an inter-
mediary period.”9 I contend that, in the midst of this “intermediary period” in French religious life 
(a notion that is backed up in contemporary print media), Morocco provided an ideological space 
in which the French populace could appear unified and in which they could create a new, secular-
ized “Christian” identity even as they drew upon the familiar bifurcation between Christianity and 
Islam that had existed for centuries in France‟s mythology.  
Although this notion of a “Christian France” in Morocco after the Law of Separation was 
riddled with complexities, undoubtedly contested, and not indicative of a true religious unity within 
the metropole, the discursive ties that still existed between the secular French nation and Christian-
ity (ties that were based in discourses of morality and civilization) legitimized the explicit references 
to a “Christian France” after 1905. Pushing this notion further, my thesis contends that the French 
print media, government figures, and other writers used the discourse surrounding Morocco to 
associate the French with a new brand of Christianity—a Christianity that highlighted the civilized 
aspects of France that it did not share with the Moroccans. The label “Christian” was employed in 
rhetoric regarding Morocco to highlight France‟s moral and civilizational superiority. Ultimately, I 
assert that France‟s interactions with Morocco reveal the beginnings of a trend by which Christiani-
ty in France (in public discourse—not necessarily in practice) became more concerned with assert-
ing its moral superiority and over religious and racial inferiors than it was occupied with issues of 
salvation or religious practice. As stated earlier, there were undoubtedly many French secularists 
who privately practiced Christianity: it was not necessarily contradictory for French people (even 
those unaffiliated with any particular religious association) to associate France with Christainity after 
                                                          
9
 Emile Durkheim, On Morality and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), xlvii. 
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1905. However, given the tentative political and religious climate(s) of the early twentieth century, 
the fact that the secular media, members of the French government, and members of non-affiliated 
colonial lobby groups unequivocally associated France with Christianity for years after 1905 in rela-
tion to Morocco suggests a deeper trend within French religious rhetoric that merits investigation. 
Additionally, the influx of North African Arab immigrants into France over the course of 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have brought questions of religion, secularization, and plu-
ralism in France to the forefront of public discussion. The secularized form of French Christianity 
presented in this thesis continues to be shaped and defined by French people‟s interactions with 
supposed religious and racial inferiors within the Fifth Republic. Therefore, it is crucial to study 
moments of rupture in French religious life (such as the Law of Separation) in conjunction with 
French colonial endeavors in North Africa so as to better understand the nature of French concep-
tions of religion within a framework of secular republicanism.  
Before proceeding any further, a few clarifications are necessary. This thesis does not in-
tend to carelessly conflate the terms “Catholic” and “Christian.” Clearly, the two words do not al-
ways represent the same people or group and, as a result, must not be thrown around haphazardly. 
However, contemporaries in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century France did use these 
words interchangeably. While these terms were undoubtedly contested and loaded with various 
meanings, a discursive analysis of these terms suggests that contemporaries used the two words 
synonymously in the early twentieth century. It is obvious that the French media assumed the 
overwhelming majority of French people who were likely to associate themselves with Christianity 
were Catholic. This thesis will define these terms based on such assumptions while at the same 
time maintaining full awareness of the complexities inherent in such a methodological approach. 
 
1.1 Historiography 
7 
 
This thesis combines and complicates two well-developed bodies of historiography: the his-
toriography of religion and French secularism, or laïcité, within France and the historiography of 
French colonialism. While both of these historiographical areas shed light on the nature of religion 
and empire in twentieth-century France, it is in their overlap where the most interesting and reveal-
ing complexities reside regarding French identity. Religious evolution in twentieth-century France 
did not occur within an ideological bubble. Therefore, it is crucial to understand any religious 
change or trend amongst the French populace in light of its interactions with the people in France‟s 
colonies. 
Chronologically, my primary source analysis begins in the late nineteenth century. Howev-
er, I will be drawing initially from historiography that focuses on the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries in order to uncover the discursive relationship between late nineteenth-century 
Catholics and secularists. Works such as David Bell‟s The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing 
Nationalism 1680-1800, Marcel Gauchet‟s The Disenchantment of the World, and Robert 
Gildea‟s Children of the Revolution all discuss the waning of Christianity in France and the advent 
of secular nationalism over the course of the eighteenth century. Bell‟s work in particular demon-
strates that nationalism in France borrowed heavily from religious discourse and religious practice, 
a notion that has proven itself crucial in the development of my research questions. In my work, I 
expand on Bell‟s assertions. Not only did secular nationalism draw heavily from religious language, 
but also notions surrounding laïcité itself were discursively bound to Christianity.  
Works that focus on religion, morality, gender, and laïcité in nineteenth-century France 
have also shaped the ways in which I have approached my research. Caroline Ford‟s Divided 
Houses, Frederick Brown‟s For the Soul of France, Gilbert D. Chaitin‟s Culture Wars and Litera-
ture in the French Third Republic, and Patricia Tilburg‟s Colette‟s Republic: Work, Gender, and 
Popular Culture in France 1870-1914 each discuss the roles of religion and secularism in nine-
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teenth-century France. However, these works (with the exception of Tilburg) overwhelmingly sup-
port the idea of a divided France (either secular versus Catholic or male versus female) in regards 
to religion. As implied earlier, my thesis implements the concepts and methods derived from 
Bell‟s book and asserts instead that the people of France were linked within a discursive frame-
work of morality and civilization that was based in Catholic rhetoric and tradition. While this may 
be an interesting notion in an exclusively French framework, the discursive unity mentioned above 
can only be fully explored and understood in the colonial context. The French people seemed to 
be uncharacteristically unified in regards to Catholicism when they wrote, read, and spoke about 
the supposed exotic, amoral peoples of the Islamic world. 
Works on French colonialism in general, such as Robert Aldrich‟s Greater France: A His-
tory of Overseas Expansion, and Alice Conklin‟s A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of 
Empire in France and West Africa 1895-1930, have increased my knowledge of general trends 
within French colonial historiography. Additionally, works that deal with colonial sexuality and the 
role of sex within empire, such as Mrinilini Sinha‟s Specters of Mother India: The Global Restruc-
turing of an Empire, Ann Laura Stoler‟s Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the In-
timate in Colonial Rule, and Judith Surkis‟ Sexing the Citizen: Morality and Masculinity in France 
1870-1920 have demonstrated the fundamental position of European views towards “native” sexu-
ality in the making of Empire. Stoler‟s work, in particular, which asserts that European identity was 
constructed in the colonies, has shaped my approach towards studying Moroccan sexuality.  
Additionally, I have utilized scholarship that deals almost exclusively with colonialism in ei-
ther North Africa or Morocco. Works such as Sahar Bazzaz‟s Forgotten Saints: History, Power, 
and Politics in the Making of Modern Morocco, Dana S. Hale‟s Races on Display: French Repre-
sentations of Colonized Peoples, 1886-1940, and Douglas Porch‟s The Conquest of Morocco dis-
cuss French political action in Morocco, outline general French perceptions of the Moroccans, and 
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discuss the cultural interactions that took place in the formative and early years of the protectorate. 
Works on the Jihadist culture that existed in Morocco have also influenced my research, most no-
tably Amira K. Bennison‟s Jihad and Its Interpretations in Pre-Colonial Morocco. In discussing 
Moroccan religious culture, societal mores, and gender roles, these works have enabled me to bet-
ter understand the meaning behind French language surrounding Morocco as it relates to French 
religious identity. For example, Bennison‟s emphasis on the centrality of religion to the people liv-
ing in pre-colonial Morocco may help explain why a religiously based binary cropped up in French 
public discourse regarding the North African country.  
Finally, monographs that address the connected and integrated history between secularism 
and Catholicism have also contributed to the ideas disseminated in this thesis. Monographs that 
highlight the sometimes-fluid boundaries between secular and Catholic ideals in France both be-
fore and after the Law of Separation are still somewhat rare. However, French historians have 
shown that, in certain moments, Catholics joined forces with agnostic reactionaries for political rea-
sons, secular revolution might promote the spread of Christianity around the globe, and republi-
cans and missionaries might choose to work together for the glory of empire. Secularism and Ca-
tholicism were never mutually exclusive entities within French society.  
In his work, Nationalism, Positivism, and Catholicism: The Politics of Charles Maurras and 
French Catholics 1890=1914, Michael Sutton discusses the relationship between the Positivists and 
the Catholics in the conservative group Action Française in the early twentieth century. Sutton‟s 
evaluation of Action Française enables us to witness a gathering of secularists and Catholics with 
expressly different beliefs combining to fulfill common (albeit harmful and damaging) political and 
cultural goals. In fact, the group‟s agnostic leader Charles Maurras stated in 1904, “All our favorite 
10 
 
ideas, namely order, tradition, discipline, hierarchy, authority, continuity, unity, work, family, cor-
poration, decentralization, autonomy were safeguarded and perfected by Catholicism.”10 
Additionally, Sarah Curtis‟ work Civilizing Habits: Women Missionaries and the Revival of 
French Empire illustrates the ways in which Catholic missionaries shaped and influenced early re-
publican French colonial projects. Curtis demonstrates that the overthrow of Catholicism during 
the French Revolution, far from extinguishing religion in France, led to the production of a “new 
kind of nun, both active and uncloistered.”11 According to Curtis, these post-revolutionary French 
nuns, “through their missionary work…were integral to the process of transforming France into 
both a modern state and a global empire.”12 In this account, revolution begets a more globally 
minded Catholic mission, which in turn results in the modernization of France and the expansion 
of empire.  
Entering into the religious fray of the early twentieth century, JP Daughton‟s work, An Em-
pire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism 1880-1914, dis-
cusses the crucial role that France‟s missionaries played in colonial projects in Indochina, Mada-
gascar, and Polynesia. Particularly, Daughton contextualizes colonial mission work during this pe-
riod and examines it in relation to the debates between secularists and Catholics in the metropole. 
Daughton contends that, “while the point of departure is discord” between the secularists and the 
Catholics, his work “ultimately explores one venue—the empire—where, in an age of division and 
polemic, Frenchman chose reconciliation and cooperation, if not mutual admiration.” Despite vo-
cal criticism from anticlerical republicans, “the colonial administration ultimately defended the 
presence of Catholic missionaries abroad.” As a result, Daughton concludes, “there was a consid-
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erable portion of the French population committed to both Catholicism and the republic‟s colonial 
cause.”13 
Clearly, current historiography contends that the French had been crossing the porous 
boundaries between enlightenment, revolution, and religion since 1789, influenced simultaneously 
by seemingly divergent ideologies over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
However, what did it mean for secularists to associate with Christianity in the colonial context after 
the Law of Separation? How do we understand these people—either expressly against religion or 
simply unaffiliated—who identified explicitly with Christianity during a period of French history in 
which Catholicism was often considered reactionary in public discourse? If Catholicism was meant 
to be a private affair after 1905, why emphasize France‟s “Christian” identity in public spaces? My 
work will attempt to answer these questions by uncovering the modifications made to “French 
Christianity” that occurred in France as a result of the French populace‟s rhetorical interactions 
with Morocco. These changes, which resulted in an altered conception of French Christianity, one 
that was based on the superiority of French morality and superior culture, continue to characterize 
French attitudes towards religious “inferiors” and influence public policy in France in the twenty-
first century. 
 
1.2 Organization 
Chapter one, titled “Two Frances? Secularism and Christianity in Belle Époque France in 
Relation to the Moroccan Protectorate,” will historicize the relationship between the Catholic 
Church and the French state, consider the discursive relationship between the Catholic faith and 
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laïcité, and examine the constructed religious binary between the “French Christians” and the 
“Muslim savages” that existed in the early twentieth century.  
According to David Bell, religious and nationalistic discourses were intertwined in France 
in the years following the Revolution in 1789. Using Bell‟s theoretical and methodological models, 
chapter one analyzes contemporary language and suggests that French secularism, or laïcité, oper-
ated within a discursive framework rooted in morality and Catholic language. Judging by contem-
porary governmental debates and bulletins, leaders and prominent men in the Third Republic 
were required to harness this “moral discourse” in order to legitimize and justify the Law of Sepa-
ration. Most importantly, this chapter argues against the strict notion of “Two Frances.” The no-
tion of “Two Frances” refers to the division (underlined by many French scholars) in the late nine-
teenth century between the supporters of a secular, republican France and advocates of an aristo-
cratic, Catholic France. And granted, after France‟s humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, 
the debate between forward-thinking, rational republicans and nostalgic, faithful Catholics became 
prominent in public discourse.  
However, as suggested earlier, the two groups were not as mutually exclusive as current 
scholarship suggests. I assert that a “discourse of morality” continued to connect the people of 
France to their Christian heritage after the Law of Separation was passed in 1905. That is, even 
though the French secular media and government publically eschewed the influences of the Catho-
lic Church within French society in the years surrounding 1905, secularists and Catholics contin-
ued to share similar conceptions of morality as they related to a prolific French state. Interestingly, 
many French newspapers that covered France‟s endeavors in Morocco in the first decade of the 
twentieth century consistently referred to the French people as “Christians” while the Moroccans 
13 
 
were collectively labeled as “Muslim barbarians.”14 While the chapter contends that the notion of a 
united “Christian France” was a construction utilized to belittle the humanity of the rebellious Mus-
lim population and legitimate France‟s colonial ventures in Morocco, the label “Christian” would 
have resonated with the French who still adhered to a moral discourse that the secularists shared 
with the Catholics. As the French populace pondered over religion‟s new role in the years after 
1905, its rhetorical interactions with the people of Morocco insinuates that notions concerning 
what it meant to be a “French Christian” were wrought in the colonies as well as in the metropole. 
 Chapter two, titled “Sexuality, Religion, and the Implementation of Power in Morocco,” 
examines the discourses specifically concerning religion, sexuality, and morality that were utilized 
in order to justify France‟s meddling in Morocco. French journalists and government officials cre-
ated a French “Christian” identity regarding sexuality within the Moroccan context in order to justi-
fy France‟s mission civilisatrice in the Islamic country. Despite the fact that France‟s civilizing mis-
sion in Morocco was not explicitly religious, its advocates in the French government and populace 
associated it with a cultural and moral superiority rooted in Christian discourse.  
This French cultural superiority bound up in the label “Christian” is most visible in con-
temporary comparisons in print media, literature, and government brochures between the “moral” 
sexuality of the French and the supposed degenerate sexuality of the Moroccans. By first establish-
ing a connection between the Third Republic‟s notions of proper, civilized sexuality and Christiani-
ty, the chapter explores the relationship between the two seemingly opposite entities, viewing how 
notions of a civilized “Christian” French sexuality played out in the Moroccan context. Judith 
Surkis asserts in her work Sexing the Citizen that “understood as a source and sign of social order 
and morality, the conjugal organization of sexual difference could also operate as an index of cul-
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tural superiority.”15 According to Surkis, heterosexual, monogamous relationships were indicative 
of civilization to many people living in early twentieth-century France. Building on this notion, 
chapter two demonstrates that the French media portrayed Moroccan sexuality as degenerate and 
barbaric in order to underline France‟s innate superiority over the Moroccan Muslims and to vali-
date and necessitate the French mission civilisatrice in Morocco.  
The dominant discourses concerned with sexuality in France were tied to Catholicism and 
contained in them an innate sense of cultural superiority. When viewed in the context of Morocco, 
the invocation of a French and Christian moral authority suggests that religion continued to influ-
ence French colonial identity after the establishment of the Law of Separation, albeit in an increas-
ingly secularized form.  
Chapter three, “The Secularization of French Christianity,” demonstrates that France‟s 
Moroccan endeavors shaped and reflected a fluctuating and changing French religious identity 
within the metropole itself. As division and a sense of rupture—caused by the Dreyfus Affair and 
the Law of Separation—pervaded metropolitan France in the early twentieth century, Morocco 
provided an ideological space for writers, colonial lobbyists, and government officials to create a 
more worldly “Christian” identity that simultaneously tied France to its illustrious Christian past 
and its rational, secular present. That is, France‟s “Christian” identity in relation to the Moroccan 
populace was invoked to underline more “secular” aspects of French culture such as reason, mate-
rialism, free thought, and an emphasis on the individual. As a result, the French were disassociated 
with more fundamental aspects of religion (that were practiced by Islamic peoples) such as reli-
gious warfare and submission to religious laws without free thought. Religious fundamentalism was 
for inferior peoples. Contemporary sources highlight the superior rationality and morality of the 
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French Christians in direct relation to the Moroccans, suggesting that the “French Christians” men-
tioned in relation to Morocco were rational, moral, and civilized. However, their explicit existence 
in non-religious public discourse suggests that the Law of Separation did not extricate the French 
populace‟s connection to Catholic tradition.  
Although I am not claiming that France‟s relationship to Catholicism changed exclusively 
because of its interactions with the people of Morocco, historians cannot understand religion in 
pre-War France without taking France‟s colonial endeavors into consideration. Additionally, alt-
hough religion in France had been unceasingly contested since 1789 and had never been self-
contained, the Law of Separation fundamentally changed the French populace‟s relationship to 
religion. The law‟s consequences require historical inquiry so as to better understand national and 
religious identity in twentieth-century France. As issues of secularization, religion, and pluralism 
continue to cause tension and even violence within France today, historicizing and understanding 
the roots and causes of the tension between religion and laïcité might help shed light on the nature 
of French politics and culture as it relates to religion in the twenty-first century.  
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2. TWO FRANCES? SECULARISM AND CHRISTIANITY IN PRE-WAR FRANCE IN   
RELATION TO THE MOROCCAN PROTECTORATE 
In his work For the Soul of France, Patrick Brown asserts that after France‟s humiliating 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, “„science‟ and „supernatural intervention‟ were indeed 
the competing prescriptions for France‟s recovery. These alternatives informed France‟s social, 
political, and cultural life in the last third of the century, framing a bitter debate over the country‟s 
heart and soul.”16 From a certain perspective, Brown‟s assessment of a divided France proves itself 
persuasive. France‟s loss at the hands of the Prussian army propelled a fierce debate amongst anti-
clerical republicans and faithful Catholics in public discourse. However, while a division existed in 
the late nineteenth century between the supporters of a secular, republican France and advocates 
of a hierarchical, Catholic France, this chapter will contend that the two factions were not as dis-
parate as current scholarship suggests. Even after the victorious secular republicans passed the law 
separating the Church and state in 1905—a law which officially confined the claims of all religious 
communities to private spheres of influence—discursive ties and shared ideals connected the two 
groups, enabling them to be grouped together in French newspapers under a seemingly unified 
banner of “Christianity” in regards to France‟s imperial endeavors in Morocco. That is, although 
popular French newspapers and magazines reflected and shaped the overt religious divisions of the 
period—oftentimes ostracizing devout Catholics within the metropole—they drew upon the anti-
quated (and fabricated) binary between Christians and Muslims when covering events in Morocco, 
consistently referring to the French people corporately as “Christians” while the Moroccans were 
often collectively labeled “Muslim barbarians.”17 Although this bifurcated relationship between 
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Christianity and Islam had been well established within French mythology since the time of the 
Crusades, its continued employment after the Law of Separation deserves further examination.  
This chapter will examine the similarities between secular and Catholic ideas towards mo-
rality in conjunction with the rhetoric surrounding France‟s actions in Morocco to better under-
stand the complex nature of French religious identity in the early twentieth century. While reli-
gious discord caused by the Law of Separation threatened to rip the social fabric of France apart, 
many French people viewed the European-wide struggle for Morocco as a potentially unifying 
force. Colonial expansion was sure to smooth over the internal complications and superficial rifts 
that politics and religion caused in France during the Belle Époque. I contend that the French 
press promulgated the concept of a “Christian France” in relation to Morocco in order to indicate 
the superior moral values of a unified French civilization. Despite the fact that the French nation 
was largely characterized in contemporary discourse by its impassioned secularism and apparent 
religious division, its peoples‟ shared views of morality—views that were based on collective notions 
of superior French mores and civilization—enabled the French media to plausibly generate this no-
tion of a united “Christian France” in the Moroccan context. Most importantly, the press empha-
sized these shared, exceptional French morals in order to undermine the ethics of the Moroccan 
Muslims and thereby drum up support for and legitimize the French domination of a rebellious 
Moroccan population. Also, as stated earlier, while the imagined bifurcation between Christianity 
and Islam was not a novelty to contemporaries, its continued use after the Law of Separation sug-
gests that the notion of a “Christian France” had begun to take on a more nonreligious meaning in 
early twentieth-century public discourse. That is, the label “Christian” was employed in rhetoric 
regarding French action in Morocco to highlight France‟s civilizational and moral superiority over a 
religious inferior rather than to imply any type of collective, national religious devotion.  
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2.1 Two Frances, One Superior Moral Civilization 
In order to explore the shared ideas about morality that existed among secularists and 
Catholics, it is necessary to historicize the complicated relationship that existed between the Catho-
lic Church and the French State. On the eve of the French Revolution of 1789, the Catholic 
Church and its clergy held inordinate amounts of discursive and material power. Not only did the 
Church alone possess the knowledge and administer the rituals that led to salvation, but it also took 
precedent over the nobility and the third estate in political assemblies and had significant judicial 
and fiscal privileges under the Ancien Regime.
18
 However, this power was quickly fading. The reli-
gious, political, and philosophical shifts that stemmed from Enlightenment ideas in the earlier dec-
ades of the eighteenth century caused many French men and women to perceive God as absent 
from the realm of human events. David Bell upholds this notion in his work, The Cult of the Na-
tion in France: Inventing Nationalism 1680-1800, claiming that by the end of the eighteenth centu-
ry, there was a broad shift in the way the French perceived the world around them. By means of 
this ideological shift, the French progressed from a perspective in which humanity was seen as 
subordinate to external (particularly divine) determinations to one in which it was seen as sovereign 
and self-sustaining. This shift would make it feasible for the French to hold up the nation, rather 
than God, as the source of all legitimate authority.
19
 As dialogue concerned with scientific 
knowledge and faith in reason increased and gained adherents, power in France shifted significant-
ly. The Church‟s monopoly over all things spiritual and intellectual was diminished in a culture 
increasingly reliant on science and reason. In addition, the growing belief in scientific truth ren-
dered the Church incapable of laying claim to any undisputed absolutes. As a result, the rational, 
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republican values of the French nation allowed it to harness discursive and ideological control over 
France‟s populace at the expense of the Church. 
While it might be tempting to understand these new ways of perceiving and ordering the 
world as a process of “de-Christianization,” the men and women living in eighteenth-century 
France did not necessarily lose their faith or come to disbelieve in God. Religion simply began to 
assert less power in the public and political realms. Bell claims that the Christian began to “confine 
himself in his everyday life to altogether secular attitudes…looking exclusively to the rule of pru-
dence and good sense to regulate the details of his life.” This shift in attitude does not so much re-
flect a process of secularization as it does an “interiorization” of belief. That is, belief was over-
whelmingly relegated to the private consciences of individual believers. This privatization of reli-
gion, the growing conviction that true religion had no particular connection with the body politic, 
and the subsequent, subtle favoring of secular power over divine power enabled Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau‟s notion—that a properly constituted national community required a civil religion that 
would inspire people to love their duties—to eventually become a reality in France.20 In this way, the 
French nation arose both out of and against a religious system of belief. In other words, despite the 
fact that the French nation was gaining ideological authority in France at the expense of the 
Church, this new “faith in the nation” cannot be accurately understood without reference to reli-
gion.
21
 This is partly because the early French nationalists borrowed extensively from Christianity‟s 
symbolic stockpile. The notion that “faith in the nation” and Catholicism were symbolically and 
discursively interrelated in France in the years following the Revolution of 1789 serves as a crucial 
foundation for this argument. The rhetorical overlap and tension that existed between Catholicism 
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and secularism would endure in public discourse into the twentieth century with fascinating ramifi-
cations.   
The Concordat of 1801, an agreement between Napoleon Bonaparte and papal and cleri-
cal representatives in both Rome and Paris, overturned the revolutionaries‟ efforts at de-
Christianization by defining the status of the Roman Catholic Church in France. The Concordat 
named Catholicism as the religion of the French majority, put the state in control over all religious 
matters, and established a ministry of religion in charge of naming Catholic bishops and overseeing 
the practice of other religions. Although Catholicism was no longer the official state religion in 
France as it had been before the revolution, ties between the Church and the French government 
were reestablished. French Catholicism did not go back to its seemingly invulnerable pre-
revolutionary status, but the government acknowledged it as the “religion of the great majority of 
the French people.”22 The Concordant would remain law until the Law of Separation passed in 
1905. 
The years 1870-1871 were ones of tremendous upheaval for France. The Franco-Prussian 
War resulted in the overthrow of Napoleon III, the creation of the French Third Republic, and 
the military defeat of France. After this humiliating loss, republican advocates of scientific progress 
and Catholic promulgators of a nationwide return to Christianity emerged as two competing forces 
attempting to bring about the material, ideological, and spiritual recovery of France. When discuss-
ing this outward, bitter struggle between scientific rationalism and religion that ensued among the 
anticlerical officials of the Third Republic and the adherents of Catholicism, Frederick Brown re-
fers to France as “a nation divided.”23 Similarly, Caroline Ford states in her work Divided Houses: 
Religion and Gender in Modern France that “the advent of the Third Republic in 1871 brought…a 
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pitched battle between the Catholic Church and the republic.”24 Robert Gildea also supports this 
notion of a split France in his book, Children of the Revolution: The French 1799-1914, by assert-
ing that “the division between anticlerical republicans and Catholics remained clear” in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
25
 At first glance, this period seems to be one in which the 
Church increasingly lost ideological ground to the republicans, who finally triumphed in 1905 with 
the passing of the Law of Separation.  
Contemporary sources also demonstrate this overt divide within pre-War society. Count-
less newspapers, magazines, and monographs written in the years leading up to and following the 
Law of Separation highlight the contention that existed between secularists and Catholics. The an-
ticlerical work L‟Évolution de la morale, by Charles Letourneau, speaks of the “terrifying tyranny 
that the religion of Jesus placed on the souls and bodies of the French populace.”26 Another article 
written by secularist Émile Combes, Une Deuxième campagne laïque, stated that “the Church lim-
its the liberties and actions” of the French people.27 In a debate over the Law of Separation, one 
Third Republic anticlerical government official described the Catholic Church as “a permanent 
menace for the future, the seed of new and innumerable conflicts.”28 An article in the politically 
moderate Le Matin from December 9, 1905 stated of the Church, “it does not need to offend the 
government or civilians, nor interfere in the political discussions of the nation.” Instead, “its do-
main is the conscience, the interior. Its work is lawfully exercised only on the soul.”29 Similarly, an 
editorial referring to the Law of Separation in Le Matin from January 1906 stated, “This agree-
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ment…makes religion an essentially personal matter. Since this reform is made in a spirit of justice 
and it guarantees freedom of conscience in the most absolute way, we have only to congratulate 
ourselves. We can finally see that religious truths are only supported by those who profess them.”30 
Evidently, the debates over the role of religion in French society circulated throughout the public 
sphere for years. Additionally, on November 11, 1906, an article in Le Matin declared, “The 
Christians are not obliged to quit worshipping…but we have the government‟s assurance that it 
won‟t recognize any religious associations.”31 This language demonstrates that an antagonistic atti-
tude towards Catholics cropped up in French public discourse in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Although France‟s fervent Catholics did not remain silent—newspapers have 
references to Catholics who claimed that science and secularism were a “danger to the faith of the 
children of France”—Catholic counterarguments undoubtedly served to create a deep yet superfi-
cial rift in French society.
32
 However, as stated earlier, while debates between secularists and Catho-
lics over the role of religion in France characterized a large part of French cultural and political life 
in the Belle Époque, a discursive analysis of contemporary public rhetoric reveals these two seem-
ingly oppositional entities were not as ideologically disparate as it may seem.  
In the late nineteenth century, as the battle for the soul of France raged, an aggressive form 
of secularization, or laïcité, emerged under the French Third Republic. Laïcité, by definition, re-
fers to the separation of Church and state through the state‟s protection of individuals from the 
claims of religion.
33
 Despite the fact that the majority of government officials in the Third Republic 
believed progress depended on scientific truth rather than religion, they still feared the potential 
influence of the Catholic Church in the public sphere.
34
 In Colette‟s Republic: Work, Gender, and 
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Popular Culture in France 1870-1914, Patricia Tilburg asserted that the Republic‟s secularization 
efforts (particularly in public schools) and its promotion of a secularized interior life resulted from 
a belief that any mention of religion would help bolster the cultural and political influence of the 
Catholic Church in France.
35
 However, after liberating the French populace from the “moral shack-
les of the Church,” government officials recognized that a vigorous morale laïque [secular morality] 
was required to replace Christianity‟s moral imperative to revive the nation.36  
Although Tilburg touches on the importance of morale laïque in the Third Republic‟s sec-
ularizing initiatives, I contend that the moralizing crusade of laïcité itself developed out of French 
Catholic discourse and ideals. That is, French secularism depended heavily on laying claim to dis-
courses of morality that the Church had employed for centuries. Specifically, Third Republic offi-
cials constantly evoked ideas of a morally superior, exceptional French civilization. Even though 
officials of the Third Republic minimized France‟s role as “eldest daughter of the Church” in Eu-
rope, notions of France‟s morally unrivaled civilization were unquestionably linked to its Catholic 
tradition. For example, a study titled De La Famille: Leçons de philosophie morale, written by phi-
losopher Amédée de Margerie and published by a Catholic group in 1894 states, “A moral civiliza-
tion is the heritage we have received from the Church.”37 Similarly, the work La Morale sans dieu, 
ses principes et ses conséquences, written by Christian apologist Auguste-Théodore-Paul de Brog-
lie, claimed that “the establishment of Christianity in France brought significant moral, social, and 
civilizational progress.”38 Even the above-mentioned anticlerical work, L‟Évolution de la morale, 
conceded, “the Christian Church laid the framework for the progressive, new [secular] morality.”39 
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Although secularists attempted to disentangle these ideas of morality and civilization from French 
Catholicism, the latent connections between morals, civilization, and Christianity proved significant 
in early twentieth-century public rhetoric.  
Although Christianity was not the only source of morality in France, French secularist no-
tions surrounding ethics during the Belle Époque reveal a direct connection to religion. In fact, 
multiple sources suggest that republican morality was intended to offer an alternative to Christiani-
ty. Author Albert Dès‟ commentary on secular morals, Éducation morale et civique, underlines 
this complicated relationship. In the anticlerical work, Dès discussed the benefits of a secular ver-
sion of morality: “These morals are more rational than Christian morals which are too particular, 
too numerous, and too circumstantial.” Secular morals “would not be concerned with religious af-
filiation, but would be based on the universal conscience and immutable reason of humanity.”40 
Despite his clear desire to move beyond a Christian form of morality, Dès‟ work demonstrates a 
perceived (albeit negative) link between established religious values and new secular mores. 
Charles Letourneau‟s L‟Évolution de la morale again underlines the innate connection that existed 
between secular morals and Christianity in the minds of contemporaries. Letourneau admitted in 
his fervently anti-Christian work, “to be fair, Christianity is responsible for the dissemination of civi-
lized ideas such as brotherhood and charity. It is here that it has its importance.”41 However, while 
these sources ultimately suggest an imagined difference in Catholic and secular morality, a deeper 
look at these professed differences reveals significant similarities between the two groups.  
Admittedly, works published by Catholic groups suggest that for Catholics, morality was 
partly characterized by submission to God, the acceptance of his will, and keeping the body and 
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mind away from secular influence.
42
 For example, Margerie‟s work De La Famille: Leçons de phi-
losophie morale, glorifies the undisputed “moral power” the Medieval Church exerted over the 
people of France and asserts that French society was the most “civilized” when France was “Chris-
tian in faith, in public morals, in law, in institutions, in science, in art, and in language.”43 However, 
Catholic moral ideals also functioned to produce more practical, earthly results for contemporary 
Catholics. When properly exercised, moral behavior produced ethical mothers and fathers, ena-
bled familial affection, allowed French civil life to function properly, and, most importantly, fos-
tered a deep love for France among its citizens.
44
  
Some Catholic writers also suggested that morality contributed to the preservation of 
French civilization. The Catholic novelist and philosopher George Fonsegrive argued in his work 
Morale et société, that “morals maintain an indispensable cohesion and enable the existence of 
civil society…the moral order is based on superior reasoning.”45 Fonsegrive‟s work suggests that, at 
least in the eyes of many contemporary Catholics, a moral populace produced a superior civiliza-
tion. Similarly, the Catholic pamphlet La Conscience naturelle et la conscience religieuse: Philoso-
phie morale, by Henri Kleffer, contended that, without a moral populace, “the social edifices of 
France will crumble into barbarism.”46 For Catholics, morality both exhibited and produced an in-
comparable, patriotic, and civilized French citizenry.  
Conversely, the secularists did not believe Christianity should influence French institutions 
or laws. Despite the fundamental disparities between Catholics and secularists, however, both 
groups defined the purpose and expected results of morality much in the same way. Chief among 
these similar conceptions was the belief that a moral populace both demonstrated and enhanced 
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France‟s superior civilization. Albert Dès‟ Éducation morale et civique states of the French (after 
making a list of “savage” peoples who lacked moral, patriotic sentiments), “Among civilized peo-
ples, the love of the patrie is based on reason, traditions, and morals.”47 Also, Dès affirmed that the 
objective of teaching morality was to produce “patriotic” French citizens filled with “charity, per-
sonal dignity, justice, good habits, and moral thoughts.”48 Even more compelling is the monograph 
Études de morale by positivist philosopher and professor Frédéric Rauh, which directly connected 
Catholic morality and patriotism by stating that Catholic traditions and morals were the sources out 
of which the French population‟s patriotic sentiments came. The nonreligious work links the con-
cepts of morality, justice, and love for the patrie within its pages.
49
 Judging by these examples, both 
Catholics and secularists believed that morality (even an explicit Catholic morality) led to a deep 
love of France and contributed to the upkeep of an exceptional, just French civilization. While the 
role of religion was the fundamental point of contention between the fervent Catholics and the 
secularists, their comparable language reveals that they perceived the aim of morality to be quite 
similar. Discourses concerning the exceptionality of French civilization and morality thus resonated 
with both Catholics and secularists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
2.2 French “Christianity” and Its Discursive Influence Over Colonial and Religious Ideology 
Although the explicit, seemingly untroubled association between France and Christianity in 
the Moroccan context was merely discursive and not indicative of true religious devotion or unity 
in the metropole, the construction of a “Christian France” in French print media after the Law of 
Separation is plausible for two reasons. Firstly, the press clearly understood that the notion of a 
“Christian France” still resonated with the broader French populace despite the anticlericalism and 
                                                          
47
 Dès, Éducation morale, 351. 
48
 Ibid, 5. 
49
 Frédéric Rauh, Études de morale (Paris: F. Alcan, 1911), 183. 
27 
 
increasing secularization initiatives undertaken by Third Republic government officials. Because 
the discourse that characterized French secularist initiatives partly relied on the ideas and concepts 
originally circulated by the Catholic Church, language that tied the French people to a civilized, 
oftentimes explicitly Christian form of morality still carried significance in France in 1912. Second-
ly, despite the religious disaccord between the secularists and Catholics, both groups found a more 
formidable enemy in the Moroccans. As a result, they were willing to buy into language that em-
phasized their superior, commonly held French civilizational morals in order to justify the domina-
tion of rebellious and morally inferior practitioners of other religions. Before unpacking these 
claims, it is important to briefly outline the nature of French colonialism in general and then 
French colonialism in Morocco in particular.  
In its simplest form, French colonialism can be characterized by contradiction. French na-
tional identity under the Third Republic was bound up—at least officially—with universal human 
rights. However, as Alice Conklin asserts in her work, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea 
of Empire in France and West Africa 1895-1930, “French rule rested on a set of coercive practices 
that violated their own democratic values.”50 Nevertheless, “the French republicans did not identify 
any contradiction between their democratic institutions and the acquisition and administration of 
their empire. This was because they…were continually undertaking—or claiming to under-
take…civilizing measures on behalf of their subjects.”51 After all, what people or group would not 
want to benefit from the civilized rule of France? 
In contrast to French assumptions, the Moroccans did not want to reap the benefits of 
French civilization. Despite the increasing French economic and territorial gains in Morocco, the 
Moroccan people resisted French rule. Although Morocco did not become an official Protectorate 
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until 1912, the French press consistently drummed up support for a French seizure of the North 
African country as early as 1905. For years, France‟s newspapers were filled with examples of Mo-
roccans speaking against French meddling in Morocco, language that overwhelmingly identified the 
French as “Christian.” In December 1906, Le Matin quoted a Moroccan Muslim living in the city 
of Fez: “We will not let those French Christian dogs rule in our city!”52A few years later, an article 
in Le Matin from 1908 quoted another Moroccan: “We have the strength of God with us. We 
have several times defeated the Christians. We are sure of success. We will throw the Christians 
into the sea.”53 In 1907, Moroccan civilians and Islamic leaders deposed their impotent Sultan, 
Abdelaziz, and replaced him with his brother, Moulay Hafid. An interview with Abdelaziz ap-
preared in Le Matin in 1908. When asked why his own people deposed him, Abdelaziz apparently 
shook his head, smiled, and replied, “they accused me of selling Morocco to you Christians.”54 
Even in 1909, after Moulay Hafid had taken power, a Moroccan interviewed by the widely read 
daily, Le Figaro, declared that he “wanted to strike the sultan to prevent his dealings with the Chris-
tians.”55 Although the economic and political situations in early twentieth-century Morocco were in 
flux, the Moroccans‟ apparent hatred of the French Christians remained constant within French 
public discourse. In fact, an article in the weekly French literary magazine, La Revue de Paris, pub-
lished in 1907, stated, “Although negatively disposed towards all Christians, the Moroccans con-
sider the French Christians their particular enemies.”56  
While the fighting between secularists and Catholics endured in France, the Moroccans 
were associating the French with Christianity, many times using the term “Christians” as a synonym 
for “French.” Through print media, journalists and other writers were able to exercise power over 
                                                          
52Stephane Lauzanne, “Agression contre un officer Française,” Le Matin, December 21, 1906. 
53
 Stephane Lauzanne, “Les Sultans Marocains,” Le Matin, January 24, 1908. 
54Christian Houel, “Interview d‟Abd El Aziz,” Le Matin, May 25, 1908. 
55
 Benoît Jouvin, “A L‟Etranger: Au Maroc,” Le Figaro, February 3, 1909. 
56
La Revue de Paris (Bureaux de la Revue de Paris, 1907), 344. 
29 
 
contemporary discourse in deciding which stories to cover and which quotes to include. Because 
this language littered the pages of French newspapers for years, it is quite clear that the notion of a 
civilized “Christian France” still resonated with the French public. The press both reinforced and 
shaped this unified religious identity in relation to Morocco, and the French populace literally 
bought into it at the kiosque de presse.  
Back in Morocco, much to the dismay of the Moroccans, Moulay Hafid proved just as 
powerless as his predecessor when it came to the French. Morocco‟s poor economy and indebted-
ness to France forced the sultan to sign a treaty in the city of Fez on March 30, 1912 that officially 
established the French Protectorate over Morocco. According to the Moroccan people, Moulay 
Hafid, in a similar manner to that of his brother, had sold Morocco to Christians.
57
 Less than three 
weeks later, the capital city of Morocco, Fez, was in revolt. The rebels not only killed French mili-
tary personnel and civilians within the city, but they also attempted to take the French consulate.
58
 
This blatant rejection of the French in Morocco inevitably affected France‟s colonial mentality. Be-
cause of the underlying rhetorical struggles between French republicanism and colonialism, the 
French needed to justify their presence among the people of Morocco who rejected their influ-
ence.  
This ideological need to justify the French occupation of Morocco led to the promulgation 
of a “Christian France” in the same newspapers that were simultaneously playing up the religious 
divisions in the metropole. The French, unified against an outside enemy, created a stark contrast 
between themselves and the Muslims in order to demonstrate that the French presence in Moroc-
co was not simply desired, but absolutely critical. By employing the moniker “Christian” in con-
temporary print media, the French press gave the secularists and the Catholics a unified identity 
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with which to confront the insurrection and the Moroccan Muslims‟ “unrestrained” and blatant 
rejection of French civilization.
59
 Ironically, while debates over the role of religion sowed discord 
within France, Christianity seemed to work as a unifying force against the inferior Muslims in Mo-
rocco. While this explicit identification with Christianity is fairly conspicuous after the Law of Sep-
aration, the continued, subtle use of religious language by the secularists who based their moral 
initiatives on the antiquated discourses of the Church clearly resonated with the French populace. 
French supremacy—made legitimate by their higher moral, “Christian” civilization—justified their 
actions against the Muslim insurgents. 
This need to render the Muslims religiously inferior in order to legitimate France‟s in-
volvement in Morocco resulted in the dichotomy between French Christians and Moroccan Mus-
lims being played up in the media in regards to the massacre. In April 1912, the left-leaning, re-
publican newspaper L‟Aurore published an article that derided the “savage adherents to Islam” 
who had perpetrated the massacre. This article stated, “We Christians… placed the savages under 
our protection. Could they learn that we are now their masters? They must submit to our powerful 
occupation before another revolt takes hold of them…they must realize the material and moral ad-
vantages of our presence.”60 Obviously there was a belief among contemporaries that Muslims 
would benefit from the moral lessons the French were offering to give them. Similar language is 
found in an issue of the Catholic newspaper L‟Univers from April 24, 1912, a few days after the 
French military forces had crushed the rebellion, stating that France “would continue amongst all 
obstacles, its large, civilizing, moral, and therefore, Christian work” in Morocco.”61 Also, in early 
May 1912, a journalist for Le Figaro published an article discussing the ill-fated “Christians” who 
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were exterminated at Fez by the morally corrupted Muslims.
62
 Interestingly, secular republican and 
Catholic newspapers both contained clear references to France‟s civilized, Christian identity in rela-
tion to Morocco.  
Additionally, while public discourse regarding the Moroccan situation created the appear-
ance of an exceptional, unified French Christian identity in regards to Morocco, the popularity of 
the phrase “Christian France” within contemporary print media also sheds light on the evolving 
nature of religious identity within the metropole after the Law of Separation. By continually accept-
ing the notion that the religiously inferior Muslims were eager to kill French Christians, the French 
public, partially manipulated by journalists, arguably began to develop an altered “Christian” identi-
ty in relation to the Moroccan populace. That is, although many French newspapers during this 
time extolled France‟s new, established secularism, they simultaneously drew upon the centuries-
old conflict that set the “French Christians” against the “barbaric Muslims.” The continued use of 
this fictitious binary after the Law of Separation suggests that the concept of a “Christian France” 
was beginning to be imbued with a more secular meaning in early twentieth-century public dis-
course. The title “French Christian” was primarily utilized in the rhetoric regarding Morocco to 
highlight France‟s innate civilizational and moral supremacy and supposed unity, not a renewed 
national religious commitment.  
Clearly, the fabricated ideological rivalry between Christians and Muslims continued to en-
joy legitimacy among the French public. So, while the media responded to this established ideolog-
ical reality, it also manipulated public opinion by consistently underlining the preeminence of 
French “Christianity” in relation to the peoples of the Islamic world. In this way, print media and 
public opinion fused and, as a result, modified French conceptions of what it meant to profess 
Christianity in the grander narratives of early twentieth-century French discourse. 
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Finally, I would like to draw attention to one example that may shed light on the ways this 
explicit identification with Christianity affected French national identity and defined French experi-
ence in the early years of the Moroccan protectorate. In 1916 an edition of France-Maroc: Revue 
mensuelle published an article titled “Memories of the Massacre of Fez: April 1912.” Circulated in 
Paris between 1916 and 1925 by the French Committee for Moroccan Affairs, the magazine was 
created to highlight France‟s political, economic, and cultural achievements in Morocco in the ear-
ly years of the protectorate. The article was written by a French interpreter for the Sherifian gov-
ernment of Morocco recounting his experiences as an official during the Massacre of Fez in 1912. 
As stated earlier, a month after the Treaty of Fez was signed, the Moroccan people living in Fez 
(who were overwhelmingly Muslim) revolted for four days against the new French inhabitants. The 
rebels killed French military personnel and civilians within the city and also attempted to take the 
French consulate.  
The stark contrasts that the author, L. Mercier, depicts in his account between the civilized, 
French Christians and the barbaric, Moroccan Muslims prove significant to this study. While this 
article provides only a limited perspective, the fact that this French government employee recount-
ed his experiences during the massacre in Fez through a lens of religion is not inconsequential. 
The article, directed towards the “Christian survivors of the massacre,” tells the tale of the French 
civilians and government workers—still staying in the local hotel as they had just arrived from 
France—who were attacked by the growing Muslim mob in Fez.63 It is a tale that highlights the 
French Christians‟ sacrificial bravery and the Muslims‟ savagery, and it reaches its climactic mo-
ment when an Islamic holy man “covered in rags” saws off the head of a courageous French man 
attempting to save his companions. After he is finished with the account of his traumatic experi-
ence, Mercier stated (from the safety of 1916), “That was Fez in 1912! What a long way we have 
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come since then! Today, a fair meets on the same streets, attended by the massacarists of yesterday 
and the benevolent winners. The contrast between yesterday and today entitles us to plead in favor 
of French action in Morocco—the facts speak for themselves.”64  
Judging by its language, this article sought to make the case that the Muslims‟ former bar-
barity and lack of morality merited French intervention in Morocco; the supposed improvements 
in the Moroccans‟ actions and behavior were irrefutably good. And, considering the fact that it was 
one of many contemporary works that discussed the immorality of the Moroccans, its themes res-
onated with the French public. Mericer‟s narrative demonstrates the endurance of a French “Chris-
tian” identity even after the Law of Separation in 1905. Not only did the explicit association with 
Christianity that emerged in regards to the massacre define the French against the inferior Mus-
lims, but it also characterized, at least in this example, the colonial experience of the French in 
Morocco (Christians versus Muslims) and justified the French civilizing presence there.  
The historical relationship between the Catholic Church and the moralizing, secular ideals 
behind laïcité is indeed complex. However, I have asserted in this chapter that these two entities 
were connected through their ideas, particularly as they related to the Moroccan protectorate. In-
terestingly, rhetoric regarding religious association was utilized to simultaneously divide groups 
within France and unify the French against outside foes. Obviously, this notion of a “Christian 
France” in Morocco after the Law of Separation was riddled with complications, unquestionably 
contested, and not indicative of a true religious unity within the metropole. However, the linguistic 
ties that still existed between the secular French nation and Christianity—ties that were based on 
notions of a superior French morality and civilization—legitimized the explicit references to a 
“Christian France” after 1905 and aided in creating an alternative colonial religious identity in re-
gards to the Moroccan Protectorate. The discursive banner of French Christianity in Morocco was 
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both plausible and incredibly useful in forging a new French identity during a time of religious re-
construction that had been brought on by the Law of Separation.  
 
3. SEXUALITY, RELIGION, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POWER IN              
MOROCCO 
“The status of females in Morocco exemplifies the relatively lax moral standards of the 
Muslims. The men are too powerful; the laws do nothing to stop their passions and the women 
become prisoners and slaves in their hands.”65 While this quotation may seem out of place in the 
economic journal in which it was published, it echoes predominant discourses in pre-War France 
regarding sexual morality and gender roles in Morocco. According to contemporaries, the Moroc-
cans‟ “moral” limitations explained their backwardness. This chapter focuses on the rhetoric that 
surrounded religion, morality, and sexuality in the French-Moroccan context and contends that this 
language was employed to justify France‟s “civilizing” presence in Morocco.  
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, French journalists, government officials, writers, 
and public figures manipulated language and produced a secularized French “Christian” identity in 
regards to Morocco. Despite France‟s new secular status, the concept of a “Christian France” gave 
historical legitimacy and weight to France‟s authority in the Islamic kingdom. While the last chap-
ter discussed how religious discourse was used to validate action against a rebellious Moroccan 
population, this chapter focuses more on how religious rhetoric was used in conjunction with dis-
course about sexuality to validate France‟s authority and civilizing mission in Morocco.  
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Even though France‟s civilizing mission in Morocco was not explicitly religious, I aim to 
prove that its advocates in the French government and popular media associated the mission to 
civilize with a cultural and moral superiority rooted in Christian discourse.
 66
 This cultural superiori-
ty based in religious rhetoric visibly manifests itself in the comparisons between the “moral” sexual 
and familial practices of the French “Christians” and the degenerate sexual practices of the Moroc-
cans. These comparisons arose frequently in literature, print media, and government documents in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century. Significantly, while debates over marriage, divorce, 
and notions of proper sexuality divided secularists and Catholics within the hexagon, the French 
populace appeared discursively unified in literature and the press when regarding the amoral sexu-
al practices of the Moroccans. Additionally, the emphasis on French “Christian” sexual practices in 
relation to Moroccan ones reinforced certain French moral ideals and structures at a rhetorical 
level in the metropole. 
While there has been significant work published on the subject(s) of sexuality and Europe-
an imperialism, my analysis adds to this body of scholarship by viewing sexuality through an explic-
itly religious lens in the French-Moroccan context. In so doing, it examines how a new brand of 
French “Christianity” was utilized to justify France‟s moral authority over the Moroccans. By un-
covering the underlying moral rhetoric shared by Catholics and secularists in France after the 1905 
Law of Separation, this chapter elucidates why the notion of a “Christian France,” though officially 
discredited by the French government, continued to be utilized in public discourse. It simultane-
ously views metropolitan moral structures and their ties to religion to understand how power was 
implemented in the colonies in the name of religion and the meaning behind such implementa-
tion. In other words, what did it mean for “French Christians” to assert their moral and sexual su-
periority over the Moroccans after 1905? The dominant discourses concerned with sexuality in 
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France came out of Catholic tradition and contained in them an innate sense of cultural superiori-
ty. When viewed in the context of Morocco, the invocation of this religiously based, moral authori-
ty suggests that religion continued to influence French colonial identity after the establishment of 
the Law of Separation, albeit in an increasingly secularized form. 
 
3.1 Historiography: Issues of Colonialism and Sexuality 
It is a well-established notion within the historiography of European imperialism that “as-
sessments of civility…were measured less by what people did in public than by how they conducted 
their private lives.”67 In other words, matters of sexuality, family, and intimacy were fundamental 
aspects of colonial policy and profoundly shaped metropolitan perceptions of the colonized. In 
her work Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, Ann 
Laura Stoler asserts that “colonial observers and participants in the imperial enterprise appear to 
have had unlimited interest in the sexual interface of the colonial encounter.” In fact, Stoler pro-
nounces, “no subject is discussed more than sex in colonial literature…lurid descriptions of sexual 
perversion marked the Otherness of the colonized for metropolitan consumption.” 68 Julia Clancy-
Smith discusses similar themes in her article, “Islam, Gender, and Identities in the Making of 
French Algeria, 1830-1962.” Clancy-Smith states, “Colonial male writers…believed Arab men to be 
„over-sexed.‟ The social consequences of exaggerated male sexuality, symbolized by polygamy and 
the harem, were [in the eyes of the colonial masters] momentous for North African Muslim civili-
zation.”69  
                                                          
67
 Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2010), 6. 
68
 Ibid, 43. 
69
 Julia Clancy-Smith, “Islam, Gender and Identities in the Making of French Algeria 1830-1962” in Domesticating the 
Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism, ed. Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998), 162. 
37 
 
Differences in gender roles also played a part in shaping negative European perceptions of 
indigenous, colonized peoples. Julia Clancy-Smith argues that, “As military domination gave way to 
civilian rule and moral subjugation after 1870, the status of Muslim women became increasingly 
significant for judging the culturally different, subordinate other.”70 Similarly, Mrinalini Sinha‟s 
work Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire, contends that the 1927 
literary exposé on Indian culture, Mother India, “provided graphic details of a variety of social ills 
in India, especially as they affected the position of women.”71 Clearly, perceived differences in sex-
ual practices and gender roles legitimized and justified the European domination of morally de-
generate colonized populations.  
Interestingly, while scholarship regarding European imperial power, sexuality, and gender 
in the colonies almost always references the beliefs and degraded morals of the colonized, the reli-
gious and moral convictions of the various metropolitan populations (as they relate to the colonies) 
have seldom been explored in great detail. For example, in Specters of Mother India, Sinha argues 
that many British individuals perceived “the political, economic, and social problems of India had 
a single cause, and that cause…was the very essence of the beliefs and practices of Hinduism.”72 
However, she does not address the question of how the British peoples‟ complex moral and reli-
gious convictions shaped their ideas about Hinduism? Nor does she discuss how interactions with 
the colonized might have changed or reinforced metropolitan perceptions of such religious and 
moral frameworks.  
By looking at sexuality through an explicitly religious lens, we can view how this discourse 
was manipulated to exercise power over the colonized and also understand the effects interactions 
with the colonized had on metropolitan people‟s perceptions of religion. Because the construction 
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and maintenance of “moral” and “immoral” sexual practices had historically been a mode through 
which both colonial and religious authorities managed power, sexuality proves an acute lens 
through which to examine the overlap of imperialism and religion in pre-War France. In studying 
the broader moral frameworks and religious beliefs and practices of the metropole, we can better 
understand why power was executed in the colonies in the name of religion and the meaning be-
hind this process. Specifically, what did it mean for the people of secularized France to invoke 
their corporate Christian identity in relation to the Moroccans‟ sexual practices? Thus, while the 
French justified their “civilizing” authority in Morocco through discourses of sexuality and religion, 
this type of rhetoric regarding France‟s colonial endeavors in Morocco also unveils religious and 
moral instability and insecurity within the metropole after 1905. These connections between 
French religion, sexuality, and colonialism play out in intriguing ways in France‟s interactions with 
Morocco in the formative years of the protectorate.  
 
3.2 French Sexual Morality and Religion 
First it is crucial to look at French conceptions of morality, sexuality, and religion in the 
years leading up to World War I. While an overt division existed in the period between the sup-
porters of a secular France and advocates of a Catholic France, discursive ties and shared ideals—
particularly those regarding sexual morality—connected these two groups, enabling them to be cate-
gorized under a seemingly unified banner of “Christianity” in regards to Morocco.  
Although notions regarding “proper” sexual conduct were not necessarily tied to religion in 
early twentieth-century France, anticlericalist discussions about sexuality suggest an innate connec-
tion to Catholic morals. That is, though secularists attempted to disentangle their own ideas about 
the benefits of sexual morality from French Catholicism, the two groups shared similar ideas about 
the role of morals in French society. The link between secular and Catholic mores manifests itself 
39 
 
in the analogous language employed in the secular and religious writings of the period, for both 
groups produced works that stressed the societal benefits of sexual restraint.  
Before demonstrating these connections, it is necessary to define what is meant by  “prop-
er” sexual conduct. Though Belle Époque France is often remembered for its music halls and its 
sexually liberated Bohemian artists, a framework of “middle-class respectability” characterized by 
“values of domestic order…moral sanctity...and bourgeois sexual morality” continued to exercise 
influence.
73
 According to Patricia Tilburg in her work Colette‟s Republic: Women, Gender, and 
Popular Culture in France 1870-1914, when studying the Belle Époque, “the student of history is 
left with the impression of a strangely bifurcated France—a country at once plodding through posi-
tivist reforms and reveling in avant-garde experimentation and irrationalism.”74 So, even though 
concepts of sexual morality were questioned and challenged by contemporaries on both sides, a 
moral structure that extolled sexual purity and monogamous conjugality continued to shape public 
opinion within France at the level of rhetoric. Judith Surkis upholds the view of a prevalent moral 
framework in France in her work, Sexing the Citizen: Morality and Masculinity in France 1870-
1920. Surkis states that, for certain contemporaries, “conjugal sex…produced a new moral being, a 
„new person‟, which transcended the discrete and separated individual. This union constituted and 
confirmed the social value of the married couple, while relegating all other sexual relations to the 
realm of „profanity.‟”75 Contemporaries witnessed and participated in the linguistic construction of 
conjugality as a moral ideal. 
Edward Berenson also supports this idea of an influential ethical framework in his book, 
The Trial of Madame Caillaux. Although the work‟s primary focus is on understanding the infa-
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mous 1914 murder trial of Henriette Caillaux through a lens of gender and politics, Berenson also 
sheds light on the moral climate(s) of the period. According to Berenson, the blatant sexual immo-
rality of Henriette and her husband Joseph Caillaux was a chief cause behind their fall from the 
good graces of French public opinion. When discussing an intimate letter that had been published 
in the newspapers incriminating the Caillaux, the work claims “It stood as evidence of Caillaux‟s 
adulterous liaison and thus of his questionable morality.”76 Later in the work, Berenson describes 
Joseph Caillaux—infamous for flaunting his extra-marital relations to the public—as his colleagues 
saw him: “an exemplar of libertine morality that threatened family life and national unity.”77 It is 
possible to detect in these comments a contemporary sense that sexual morality contributed to a 
wholesome French society. While this morality may have been almost exclusively at the level of 
rhetoric, it carried significance in the public sphere in early twentieth-century France. 
 This idea of “proper” sexual morality presents itself in both secular and Catholic writings 
of the period. The secular, scientific work L‟ Éducation sexuelle, by Dr E. Stérian, acknowledged 
that humans are physical beings that required sex. However, Dr. Stérian claimed that young men 
forced to satisfy their “reproductive” desires in unfavorable circumstances inevitably “acted against 
morality and practiced masturbation and homosexuality.”78 Even though this work does not con-
demn young men for having—or even fulfilling—sexual urges (proving it more open-minded than 
the traditional Catholic morality explored below), it does imply that an acknowledged, overarching 
moral code concerning sex existed within the broader discourses of early twentieth-century France. 
This “morality,” which included monogamy and heterosexual marriage, excluded homosexuality, 
which, according to the work, was “very dangerous for societies in the civilized world.” The work 
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then outlined various scientific methods through which homosexual practices might be eradicated 
from France. 
In addition, Dr. Stérian associates both physical and moral degradation with venereal dis-
ease. He states, “it is important to fight venereal disease and, in so doing, contribute to the work of 
moral regeneration” in France. 79 By linking the decline of venereal disease—a malady associated 
with prostitution and sexual promiscuity—with the idea of moral regeneration, Stérian suggested 
that a healthy, vibrant society was one in which sexuality was kept within the confines of “morality,” 
that is, heterosexual marriage. 
The socio-scientific work Amour, préservation et sécurité, by Dr. Maxwell Alexander, reit-
erates these views. While making room for the possibility of sexual liaisons outside of marriage, 
Alexander nonetheless states, “The man who wants to satisfy his sexual desires outside of mar-
riage…exposes himself to venereal disease…the danger is great.”80 For Alexander, sexual disease 
posed a great threat to French society due to the fact that it contributed to a decline in birthrates. 
Statistically, the French were falling behind their enemies in Germany in regards to population. 
Alexander contends that this was due to the fact that Germans were more likely to enter into moral 
sexual unions. The work poses the question, “What is the dominant thought and desire of the 
Germans? It is to marry!” It continues, “Marriage gives aid in the struggles of life…contracted in 
such conditions, marriage satisfies the requirements of society and the needs of nature…it engen-
ders the reciprocal attraction between the sexes and ensures fertility.”81 According to Dr. Alexan-
der, illicit sexual activity had led to a demographic and moral decline within French society. The 
Germans lived more strictly within the confines of morality and these practices benefited their 
population and culture. 
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French Catholics similarly believed sexual restraint—in the form of a heterosexual, monog-
amous union—was the key to a productive and efficient French society. The Annales Catholique, a 
weekly religious magazine that wrote about political issues relevant to the French Church, stated 
that sexual morality “is the…way to purity and fecundity in France.” The article nonetheless claims, 
“it is not possible for man to repress his passions or instincts except by submitting to God, the 
moral authority.”82 Although this work invokes the help of God instead of the help of science in 
combating sexually immoral (and therefore, degenerative) behavior, the sense that sex should be 
kept inside a moral framework for the “fecundity” of France is apparent.  
The Catholic work L‟Impureté also comments on illicit sexual practices in France. The au-
thor, Benjamin Arbousset, contends, “Our young men are in danger… If we do not educate them 
about carnal passions and the individual and societal consequences of such passions, they will 
drink the poisoned cup of vice and develop an insatiable thirst for pleasure.”83 He continues, “the 
danger we report is a terrible reality…these misfortunes that afflict families and weaken society have 
their roots deep in immorality.”84 Even though secularists and Catholics differed in their particular 
conceptions of sexual morality, there appears to have been a contemporary understanding that so-
cial and sexual practices such as heterosexual marriage and monogamy were indicative of a prolific, 
superior civilization. Literary works regarding sexuality produced by both Christians and secularists 
acknowledged a similar, inherent moral law that was linked to rhetoric hailing a productive French 
state.  
Judith Surkis supports this notion of an idealized form of civilized sexuality. In Sexing the 
Citizen, Surkis argues that many republican thinkers “imagined married heterosexuality as a motor 
and manifestation of civilizational and moral progress…conjugal complementarity be-
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came…generative of sociality itself…it bound together gender ideals…with a specifically social and 
moral account of sexuality.”85 So, how did this republican view of sexuality come to be blatantly as-
sociated with Christianity in the Moroccan context? While the role of religion was the fundamental 
point of contention between the Catholics and secularists, their comparable language reveals that 
they perceived the aim of sexual morality to be quite similar. The superior civilization that was in-
dicated by the French people‟s supposed sexual virtue resonated with both Catholics and Secular-
ists after 1905. Thus, a French “Christian” identity—used in conjunction with rhetoric about Islamic 
sexuality—was employed to unify the metropolitan populace discursively and to justify the French 
conquest of and “civilizing” presence in Morocco. 
 
3.3 Divorce, Or, French “Polygamy” 
Even though this unified “Christian” front was employed to justify French authority in Mo-
rocco, I believe that studying rhetoric that focused on matters of Moroccan sexuality, religion, and 
familial life serves to expose deeper issues and concerns within French society. During the pre-
War period, concerns over marriage, divorce, and the family loomed large in France, a result of 
fears following the country‟s defeat by Prussia in 1870 and from a perceived deterioration in 
French power that contemporaries related to moral and demographic degeneration. If France was 
weak, writers frequently claimed, its weakness was rooted in a “growing demographic deficit” 
caused in part by the legalization of divorce.
86
 Emile Durkheim outlined other potentially negative 
effects of divorce in his work L‟ Éducation morale. Durkheim stated, “If the rules of conjugal mo-
rality lose their authority, if the duties which spouses owe one another are less respected, and if the 
passions and appetites that this aspect of morality contain and regulate, were to unleash and dereg-
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ulate themselves…they would bring about a disenchantment, which would be visibly translated by 
suicide statistics.”87 Although many hailed the legalization of divorce as a step towards modernity—
an article in Le Matin amusingly claimed in 1913, “it is better to have divorce than to accept mur-
der into our moral code”—contemporary sources suggest that the issue of divorce caused division, 
disenchantment, and increased anxiety regarding demographic decay.
88
  
Interestingly, widely read contemporary sources associated divorce in France with polyga-
my, a practice overwhelmingly associated with Islam that was condemned by the French. An article 
in Le Matin stated, “When we measure the strength of a civilization, we find that the strong socie-
ties tend to practice monogamy. Whenever they decline, they return to polygamy, that form of dis-
turbed morality. Divorce is a kind of successive polygamy.”89 A similar article appeared the same 
year in Le Temps, “the strong races tend to practice monogamy…monogamy implies civilization 
and it is to this that we should return. Divorce is a type of successive polygamy.” According to this 
article, when a man and a woman divorced one another with the intention to remarry, there existed 
practices of “polygamy and polyandry simultaneously.” It went on to claim, “these are the morals 
of savages.”90 Judging by this text, contemporaries believed France was in danger of adopting sav-
age, uncivilized behavior. Sharp division and fears of potentially degenerative conduct had gripped 
the metropole during the formative years of the Moroccan protectorate. This reality inevitably con-
tributed to the French focus on the relatively depraved sexuality of the Moroccans. By adopting a 
unified “Christian” front concerning Islamic sexuality, the French media and other writers con-
nected the French populace with civilization, morality, and prolificacy, positive notions that clearly 
resonated with the French populace. 
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Moreover, as Alice Conklin states in A Mission to Civilize, “French imperial policy con-
sistently identified civilization with one principle…mastery…mastery of nature, including the human 
body, and mastery of what can be called „social behavior‟…mastery was integral to France‟s self-
definition under the Third Republic.” Because inhabitants of the non-European world lacked the 
“crucial ability to master,” they were “obviously barbarians, in need of civilizing.”91 While debates 
surrounding the legalization of divorce caused apprehension and proved so contentious within the 
metropole, the assertion of a French “Christian” civilization in the Moroccan context joined secu-
larists and Catholics and reaffirmed their relative superiority. If the French lacked the crucial ability 
to abide by—or even agree upon—correct forms of social behavior, condemning the “blatant” lack 
of mastery found within Moroccan society soothed fears caused by the debates over divorce and 
demographic decline within France. Attempting to understand and contextualize French proclama-
tions of a “Christian” civilization after 1905 enables us to better understand the complexities be-
hind the French condemnation of Islamic sexuality. A “Christian” identity in relation to Morocco 
would have superficially minimalized the complications inherent in French cultural life at the time 
and reinforced the idea of an admirable French civilization. 
 
3.4 The French in Morocco (and Elsewhere) 
Because France was fighting to establish a protectorate in Morocco in the early twentieth 
century, the rhetorical interactions between the French population and the Moroccans had the 
most profound impact on French politics and culture. However, literary works that demonstrated 
France‟s civilized, “Christian” superiority over Islam and the inhabitants of other Islamic colonies 
were also widespread. The work Psychologie sociale contemporaine by esoteric philosopher Jo-
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seph Maxwell claims “religious reasons can determine certain prohibitions.” Because of this reality, 
Islam permitted multiple wives within Islamic societies, while “Western nations and those who 
have undergone the influence of civilization and Christianity can not tolerate the plurality of wives, 
for polygamy is contrary to morality in most Christian societies.” Although Maxwell‟s work puts 
forth a more pluralistic concept of morality than Catholic publications, there remains a blatant 
connection between Christian monogamy and civilization on the one hand, and polygamy on the 
other.
92
 
The religiously toned monograph, Dieu et science by Catholic Jacques Brac de La Perrière 
stated of Islamic civilizations, “In rejecting the religion of Christ, these Mohammedans have dimin-
ished civilization…women are found in degradation and servitude.”93 According to this work, Islam-
ic peoples degraded their women and lacked civilized qualities because they had rejected Christian-
ity. This assertion implies that, in the minds of certain contemporaries, Christian morals exerted a 
civilizing power within society. Similarly, the monograph L'Islam: Impressions et etudes, by the 
Catholic writer Henry Castries, declares, “Islamic polygamy greatly offends our civilized, Christian 
morals…the two faiths are morally opposed to one another.”94 By condemning the practice of po-
lygamy, these ideologically differing writers set French “Christian” morals above those of Islam. 
The work Mœurs Arabes by secularist Witold Lemanski, compared “Christian dogmas”--
out of which French morality evolved—to Islam. The author stated, “monogamy…and polyga-
my…prove to be opposites.” He also argued that, while “monogamous marriage and its rules are 
the foundations of civilization,” polygamy was “a sign of primitive civilization.” Lemanski then 
condemned the status of women in Islamic countries: “It is the Islamic religious tradition which 
fashions the immutable souls and lives of Muslim women…Islam would be undermined with the 
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emancipation of women.”95 Although the religiously unaffiliated Lemanski was writing for a general 
audience, his invocation of France‟s “Christian” heritage points to the idea that “Christian” sexual 
morality yielded a higher civilization than Islamic ideas and practices.  Comparable rhetoric exists 
in the 1910 lecture published by a large colonial lobby group titled L'Islam et la colonisation de 
l'Afrique. The lecture, given “under the patronage of the French Colonial Union,” avowed, “In the 
interest of civilization or Christianity, we should crush or at the least limit Islam in North Africa”96 
This was due in significant part to the fact that “Islam sanctifies polygamy.”97 Judging from these 
passages, both Catholic and secular observers found common ground in condemning sexuality and 
gender roles endorsed by Islam. By linking France‟s “Christian” heritage to its civilized traditions 
and its superior ethics, Catholics and anticlericalist writers alike created a stronger reason for exer-
cising power over perceived religious inferiors.  
Newspapers in the early twentieth century echoed these discourses. An article in the news-
paper Le Temps states of the Algerian Muslims, “they will never submit to our practices…for even 
if they cease to be Muslims, they will never become Christians.” It continues, ”If we allow Muslims 
to unite with us, won‟t their familial life slowly invade our mores? For the two essential principles 
of their intimate domestic life, polygamy and the confinement of women…are signs of savagery.”98 
Not only did this article bind the morals of secular France to Christianity, it also revealed a fear 
that “savage” Islamic practices would slowly vitiate the French population‟s superior mores.  
In the case of Morocco, French monographs and newspapers were littered with references 
to the depraved practices of the Muslim inhabitants. These assertions often appeared with language 
invoking France‟s Christian identity. In the monograph Sorcellerie au Maroc, the author, scientist, 
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and secularist Emile Mauchamp, presents his work, not in the interest of religion, but in “the inter-
est of science and civilization… for beneficial instruction and scientific progress” in Morocco.99 Ac-
cording to Mauchamp, “the people of Morocco have a fear and contempt of Christians.” He stat-
ed, “in this closed world of Morocco, which exists on the fringes of radiant Europe, the people suf-
fer, sealed in their misery and wariness, refusing the help of their Christian neighbors, like obsti-
nate prisoners in their cells rejecting freedom, health, light, and comfort.”100 When commenting on 
the Islamic male practice of keeping multiple women in a harem, Mauchamp remarked, “love be-
tween women among the Moroccans exceeds moral and natural relations…the women, confined 
within the harem are, almost without exception, lesbians. Passions are born within the harems, 
provoking jealousy between the women and…homosexuality.” He also talked about the “debauch-
ery” and “lasciviousness” that inevitably cropped up among these confined women, concluding, 
“the role of women in Morocco is restricted to pure animality.”101 Clearly, Moroccans had much to 
gain from French “Christian” civilization. 
Likewise, the Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord, held in Paris on October 6-10, 1908, pro-
posed many reforms that might be made in Morocco on behalf of civilization. The printed mono-
graph consistently referred to France as “the Christian world” in regards to Morocco and stated, “it 
is certain that if reforms such as the abolition of polygamy are necessary for the social evolution of 
Muslim peoples, they may be hampered by the very fact that they are against Islamic law, which is 
immutable because, for them, it is divine in essence.”102 Though the civilized Christian world of-
fered civilization to the Moroccans, their sexual practices—embedded within their society and con-
firmed by their religious beliefs— proved an almost insurmountable obstacle. 
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Adding to these discourses are pamphlets focused on improving Moroccan ethics. The 
tract Dans le grand atlas Marocain written by humanist doctor Paul Chatinières, characterizes Mo-
roccan society by stating, “the Islamic religion determines the unique character of Moroccan cul-
ture just as Christianity created our civilization.” However, where Christian morals had contributed 
to a productive and vibrant French civilization, the acceptance of polygamy and degradation of 
women in Islamic Moroccan society, according to Chatinières, had led Moroccan society to de-
pravity.
103
 A bulletin titled Société Française de Prophylaxie Sanitaire et Morale, published by the 
secular Société Française de Prophylaxie Sanitaire et Morale, also sets “Christian” sexual practices 
above those of Islam. After encouraging men and women “inhabiting Christian countries,” to prac-
tice “monogamy” and “early marriage between a man and a women” in order to avoid “moral deg-
radation” and “carnal lust,” the work considered the oversexed nature of Muslim men that was 
causing depravity in Morocco.
 104
 It concluded that “the suppression of debauchery and polygamy 
in Morocco is desirable” due to the fact that these practices were causing venereal disease and con-
tributing to the moral decay found among the Muslims.
105
 
By referring to the entire Moroccan population as “Muslims,” the French were simplifying 
and homogenizing Moroccan society. In accepting and welcoming the label “Christian,” the French 
were doing the same to themselves, but not without a purpose. Despite France‟s new secularized 
status, “Christian” sexual morality enabled the French to define themselves against the Moroccan 
Muslims. By extolling their “Christian” civilization over that of the Moroccans‟, French writers and 
public figures not only asserted that the Moroccan population was utterly debauched (and, there-
fore, in need of French civilizing help), but they also rendered the Moroccans as fundamentally 
inferior, thereby justifying France‟s interference in Morocco. Additionally, this “Christian” label 
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reinforced a connection between sexual morality and French society and generated ideas of a fer-
tile French civilization teeming with productivity in a time of religious and moral rupture in the 
metropole.  
Despite secularization and the privatization of religion within France in 1905, a French 
“Christian” identity endured in public discourse regarding the sexual practices of colonized peo-
ples. Not only did the application of the label “Christian” justify French moral authority in Moroc-
co, the employment of this religious rhetoric also sheds light on the fluid views towards religion 
and the overlapping contemporary conceptions of morality during the Belle Époque. During a 
time of moral rupture and a reevaluation within the metropole, French public figures, writers, and 
journalists focused on the sexual immorality of France‟s Islamic colonies and protectorates. This 
served to degrade the practices of the Moroccans as well as reinforce moral structures (at the level 
of discourse) within France. By continually accepting the notion that the Moroccan Muslims were 
religiously and morally inferior, the French public arguably began to develop an altered “Christian” 
identity in relation to the sexual practices of the Moroccan populace. Because Morocco was a co-
lonial prize characterized by its divisive role in European politics in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, it proves a valuable colonial example through which to view these religious changes and 
France‟s internal and international insecurities.  
 
4. THE SECULARIZATION OF FRENCH CHRISTIANITY 
 “The separation of Church and state is difficult to consider without a certain melancholy 
mixed with anxiety…” wrote a journalist for Le Figaro on December 26, 1905, just days after the 
51 
 
Chamber of Deputies passed the Law on the Separation of the Churches and the State.
 106
 A few 
years later, French sociologist Emile Durkheim reflected on this state of religious uncertainty in 
early twentieth-century French society in an essay titled “La Conception sociale de la religion.”  
The old ideals and the divinities which incarnate them are dying because they no longer re-
spond sufficiently to the new aspirations of our day; and the new ideals which are necessary 
to orient our life are not yet born. Thus we find ourselves in an intermediary period, a pe-
riod of moral cold which explains the diverse manifestations of which we are, at every in-
stant, the uneasy and sorrowful witnesses.
107
  
 
These sources (and many others that will be examined in this chapter) demonstrate that a sense of 
rupture had taken hold of the French metropole in the years after 1905. Despite republican asser-
tions that secularization would transform humankind, once “an accursed race slouching…through a 
valley of tears,” into “an endless cortege proceeding towards the light,” a perceived sense of reli-
gious and moral decline nevertheless permeated French public rhetoric.
108
 As a response, the 
French government, media, and other public figures began to inculcate outmoded collective identi-
ties (like “French Christians”) with new meaning in a time of apparent division and strife. In so do-
ing, they affirmed the continued existence of a shared, sacred French identity, linking France to its 
high, Christian past and its secular, innovative present. This chapter explores the modifications 
made to “French Christianity” in public discourse after the Separation of Church and State in 1905 
in conjunction with France‟s colonial endeavors.  
I use the word “modifications” quite purposefully, as this chapter does not suggest the Law 
of Separation generated a complete break with France‟s former role as “eldest daughter of the 
Church,” but instead proposes that a French “Christian” identity endured in twentieth-century pub-
lic discourse, albeit with more secular connotations. While religious discord and division caused by 
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the Dreyfus Affair and the Law of Separation threatened to rip France apart, many perceived the 
European contest for Morocco as a source of potential unification. In the midst of this turbulent 
epoch in French religious life, Morocco provided a space in which the French populace could ap-
pear unified and construct an innovative “Christian” identity while drawing upon the older, estab-
lished religious division between Christianity and Islam that had existed for centuries in French 
tradition. French interactions with the Moroccan people reveal the beginnings of a cultural trend 
towards this new sense of religious identity. In popular French newspapers and other kinds of pub-
lications, “Christianity” emerged more as a trope to assert French moral superiority over religious 
and racial inferiors than a religion dedicated to the salvation of souls. 
While the previous two chapters demonstrate that the French publically identified with 
Christianity after 1905 to superficially unify and justify their superiority over the Moroccan popula-
tion, this chapter focuses explicitly on the increased “secularization” of this “Christian” label. One 
of the most celebrated aspects of the Law of Separation in contemporary rhetoric was the fact that 
religion was now meant to be an internal, private affair. An article in the popular daily Le Matin 
published on December 9, 1905 stated that the law would render the French people, “free from 
the external interferences” of religion. According to the article, internalized, covert religious ob-
servance, “would exercise its influence for the health, fecundity, and good of the country.”109 How-
ever, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, when viewed in the Moroccan context, France‟s 
association with Christianity remained overt and unconcealed in popular newspapers, academic 
literature, and government documents when discussing Islam. What does this imply about the con-
structs of “Christianity” and “Islam” as they relate to imperialism in public discourse after the Law 
of Separation? While this chapter does not suggest that it was necessarily contradictory for moder-
ate secularists or even overt anticlericalists to identify with the notion of a “Christian” France, the 
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explicit association with Christianity after 1905 regarding the new Moroccan protectorate sheds 
light on the changing nature of religious rhetoric in early twentieth-century France. 
Although many Catholic groups accepted scientific and enlightenment ideals in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contemporary discourse overwhelmingly associated the 
Catholic Church and Christianity with the despotism and backward politics of the ancien regime.
110
 
A 1905 article in the widely read daily Le Matin stated, “the separation will not affect personal 
freedom of conscience, but it will guarantee individual empowerment while ensuring the suprema-
cy of a secular power over outdated concepts of theocracy.” It continues to claim that the correla-
tion between the French state and the Catholic Church “was the work of a despotic regime” and 
that “the new regime will be the work of a free people.”111 By looking at religious discourse in re-
gards to Morocco, I will track how the secular media and other non-affiliated writers and public 
figures utilized the label “Christian” to underline aspects of French culture that generally had more 
“secular” connotations. Enlightenment values including rationality, free thought, materialism, and a 
willingness to modernize and evolve, though not typically associated with Catholicism in the years 
after the Dreyfus Affair, were linked with French “Christianity” in the Moroccan context to under-
line Moroccan fundamentalism, irrationality, and barbarity while uniting the French populace.  
In other words, French non-affiliated public figures and the media used “Christianity” as a 
rhetorical label, connecting France to its superior Christian past while simultaneously linking it with 
modern, enlightened ideals (such as rationality and progress) not typically associated with Catholi-
cism in contemporary rhetoric.
112
 Morocco, one of France‟s first and most important colonial ac-
quisitions after the Law of Separation, provided a conceptual space in which the French populace 
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(led by journalists, governmental figures, and writers) asserted its moral and cultural prolificacy and 
superiority over a religious inferior during a time of uncertainty and “moral coldness” within the 
Metropole.
113
 Because this new brand of “French Christianity” endured for decades in the French 
media and academic literature regarding Morocco, the moniker clearly resonated with both Catho-
lics and anticlericalists in the metropole. While the label did not smooth over all superficial reli-
gious divisions, the connections, complexities, and inconsistencies surrounding religion would have 
significant and detrimental ramifications within twentieth-century France. 
 
4.1 The Role of Language in France Under the Third Republic 
Before getting into the main body of the argument, it is imperative to briefly outline the re-
lationship between the French populace and language, particularly after France‟s revolution in 
1789. Modern French historiography is littered with scholarship that focuses on how the emer-
gence of new linguistic concepts radically altered the French public‟s perceptions of the world(s) in 
which they inhabited. Although the meaning of “the French public” changed and expanded be-
tween the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, the notion that ideologies might be con-
structed, the “compelling intensity” inherent in rhetorical transformation in France, and the crucial 
role of language in shaping identity remained important within French society.
114
 Echoing this idea 
in his work Culture Wars and Literature in the French Third Republic, Gilbert Chaitin claims that 
in France, “great moral power” was traditionally attributed to language and literature.115 Moments of 
great historical change and societal rupture—such as the French Revolution and the Franco-
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Prussian War—emerge within French historiography as obvious instances where language provided 
a venue through which governments, individuals, and classes exercised and legitimized power.  
While the utilization of language to accomplish political and cultural goals is obviously not 
an exclusively French practice, linguistic politics played a fundamental role in the construction of a 
modern, secular French identity under the Third Republic. In his work, Peasants into Frenchmen: 
The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914, Eugen Weber claims that the linguistic diversity 
that had characterized France for centuries prior to 1870 “became significant when it was per-
ceived as a threat to…ideological unity,” for “all citizens had to understand what the interests of the 
Republic were and what the Republic was up to.” Most importantly, the Republic “needed an ef-
fective vehicle for propaganda.” However, the Republic could hardly capture the hearts and minds 
of France‟s populace if this populace did not know the French language. According to Weber, a 
French state that had been previously “unconcerned about linguistic diversity…was replaced by an 
ideology that embraced unity as a positive good and recognized language as a significant factor in 
achieving it.” 116 Therefore educational reforms, notably the Ferry Laws of the early 1880s that pro-
vided free, secular, and compulsory education for all French children, were implemented not only 
to increase literacy rates but also to promote unity via the French language throughout the coun-
try‟s diverse regions.  
As the turbulent nineteenth century progressed, secular educators used language as a 
means to inculcate French children with a deep love for France at the expense of Catholicism. As a 
result, by the early twentieth century (the period in which the first children affected by the Ferry 
Laws reached adulthood), the French language had become more than a possession of an educat-
ed elite: “it became a patrimony in which all could share, with significant results for national cohe-
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sion.”117 In other words, language itself was the venue through which the Third Republic (allegedly) 
forged a universal, secular French identity. And, while the Republic‟s education and secularization 
initiatives appear to have succeeded in “winning” the French people‟s souls away from the alters of 
the seemingly defeated Church, religious language and a French “Christian” identity endured in 
public rhetoric into the twentieth century. So, it is this specific role of language within contempo-
rary French society and politics that prevents us from simply viewing the endurance of a discursive 
“French Christianity” as a linguistic oversight on the part of the secular republicans. Language 
played too crucial a role in the wars between the Third Republic and the Catholic Church to have 
been used indiscriminately or randomly in any circumstance. Therefore, we must set such lan-
guage within its historical contexts and judiciously consider its meaning(s). 
As stated above, when the Third Republic came to power in 1871, government officials, 
their supporters, and their critics alike mobilized language and literary phenomena for the purpos-
es of political and social warfare. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
drive for increased secularization (and the subsequent Catholic backlash), the fight for Alfred 
Dreyfus‟ imprisonment or freedom, the passing of the Law of Separation, and the continued strug-
gle to legitimize and justify moral power within Morocco all exemplify battles fought at the level of 
rhetoric within French newspapers, literature, and legislation. Certain contemporaries (of the mo-
narchial, Catholic faction) argued that, “„Frenchness‟ was…something inherited, something in the 
blood, even if political action was still necessary to purge France of impure alien influences.” In 
their eyes, “France remained a Christian, Catholic nation, part of a great and unbroken chain that 
extended from the people…to God and the kingdom of heaven.”118 Conversely, others (of the secu-
lar republican faction) asserted “the era when religion still permeated French life has definitively 
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ended, and „extinguished Christianity‟ has passed its torch to the republican patrie.”119 However, a 
faction of French republicans, in the tradition of their revolutionary forbearers, attempted to sweep 
France clean of the deleterious effects of reactionary religion (think of the Dreyfus Affair) while 
creating a new identity, “lovingly put together out of hallowed, ancient material” and rooted in 
France‟s established Christian tradition.120 In their attempts (conscious or unconscious) to “remake” 
French religious identity, this third faction of French republicans drew upon the French practice of 
imbuing words and concepts with new or alternative meanings in times of cultural upheaval (such 
as the period after 1905). In so doing, they changed what it meant to profess Christianity after the 
Law of Separation, particularly in relation to France‟s colonial holdings.  
 
4.2 Dreyfus, Durkheim, and a Period of French “Moral Coldness”  
In 1883, the well-known secularist Jules Ferry, French minister of education and author of 
the “Ferry Laws” which provided mandatory secular education for all French children, wrote a let-
ter to Pope Leo XIII. In the letter, Ferry assured the new pope that, despite republican commit-
ments to secularization, the French government had no intention of undoing the Concordat and 
separating the Church and the state.
121
 
For Ferry, the Concordat, which had governed the Church of the French majority since 
1802, “was a fixed point.”122 Catholicism in France was culturally ingrained to the point of inevitabil-
ity. In 1888 he declared in a meeting that “separation would be absolutely contrary not only to the 
beliefs of a great number of French people but to something much stronger than beliefs, to the 
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habits and traditions of the French people, to popular instinct itself.”123 Ferry believed the relation-
ship between the French state and the Catholic Church, however problematic for secular republi-
cans in the late nineteenth century, embodied a fundamental aspect of French society. Neverthe-
less, the Law of Separation passed only seventeen years later, breaking the Concordat and render-
ing France a secular state officially recognizing no religion. How do we account for this seeming 
alteration in policy? Did the secular republicans move from a place of seeming respect towards the 
French Catholic population towards a track bent on ostracizing Catholics in public discourse a 
decade later? If so, why? 
In part, Ferry was not entirely correct about the grassroots support for a “Catholic” France 
in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Across France, religious practice declined among 
such increasingly varied and heterogeneous groups as rural peasants, industrial workers, students, 
writers, and socialists. In addition, religious processions were steadily banned in various towns 
across the country and the number of civic burials rose exponentially in regions from Paris to the 
Limousin.
124
 The comments of a peasant from Beissat (Creuse) in the early twentieth century fur-
ther highlight this point. He stated of the Church and its priests, “honor be to those who cleave to 
reason instead of the enigmatic revelation…Let us shake off the monastic and clerical yoke and 
thus become free men again.”125 Judging by the language and actions of contemporaries, many 
people within France seemed to be placing a higher value on reason, science, and knowledge than 
on religious belief and practice. 
However, a far more culturally impactful episode—the Dreyfus Affair—arguably accounts 
for this shift in views towards the Catholic Church and France‟s Catholic population. The Dreyfus 
Affair was a political and cultural scandal that is conventionally known for ideologically splitting the 
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population of France from its commencement in 1894 into the early years of the twentieth century. 
Robert Gildea refers to the Dreyfus Affair as “a religious war” between the French populace. 126 
Historians have recognized the affair as a time of extreme tumultuousness in French religious and 
cultural life in the last years of the nineteenth century.  
In November 1894, Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish artillery officer in the French army, was ac-
cused of communicating French military secrets to the German Embassy in Paris. After a hasty tri-
al and conviction, Dreyfus was sent to the penal colony at Devil‟s Island in French Guinea, placed 
in solitary confinement, and forced to endure unspeakable treatment and horrendous living condi-
tions for almost five years. 
By 1898, evidence had emerged that suggested a French Army major, Ferdinand Esterha-
zy, was the real culprit. However, a military court collectively acquitted Esterhazy and the army 
subsequently accused Dreyfus of additional charges based on false documents fabricated by mem-
bers of the French army. News of the military‟s actions began to spread, chiefly owing to vehement 
works published in newspapers and other contemporary literature by progressive republican activ-
ists, such as Emile Zola, author of the famous exposé “J‟accuse,” who publically pressured the gov-
ernment to reopen the case. As stated earlier, the extreme political and judicial scandal that pro-
ceeded divided French society between those who supported Dreyfus—known as the Dreyfusards—
and those who condemned him—identified in public rhetoric as the anti-Dreyfusards.  
Although all accusations against Alfred Dreyfus were eventually proved baseless (exonerat-
ing him of all his alleged crimes), the affair led to a sense of severe moral anxiety that manifested 
itself in skepticism regarding Catholics and public religion within France (the negative views to-
wards public religion will be discussed later in the chapter). Although I am not suggesting that there 
is a direct, simple path from the Dreyfus Affair to the Law of Separation, an examination of con-
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temporary discourse indicates that, for many French people, the Dreyfus Affair highlighted all that 
was wrong with the traditionally monarchical institution of the Church. This undoubtedly affected 
average French viewpoints of the Catholic Church specifically and Christianity more generally. The 
affair both reflected and deepened the apparent rift between the Catholic, monarchical right and 
the Republican, secular left.  
Importantly, recent historiography considers the Dreyfus Affair and the 1905 Law of Sepa-
ration to be two parts of the same phenomenon. Gilbert Chaitin combines the two events in his 
analysis within Culture Wars and Literature in the French Third Republic, claiming that it was the 
Dreyfus Affair and the Law of Separation, which “divided the country into two warring camps” 
causing “internal strife which lasted until the beginning of World War I.”127 Although I have 
demonstrated in previous chapters that the two groups were not as irreconcilably distinct as present 
historiography suggests, the outward divisions between the two were formidable and caused a deep 
sense of uncertainty within metropolitan culture.  
The political and cultural upheaval caused by the Dreyfus Affair coupled with the “fanati-
cisation” of French Catholics in public discourse led to a deep mistrust of Catholics and public re-
ligion among Dreyfusards. First, I will examine the sense of societal rift within France as seen in an 
article of Le Temps from December 1899. The article stated, “There is no doubt that the Dreyfus 
Affair has been an instrument of discord for far too long between the French.” It contended that 
the affair was “causing great harm” and referred to it as “a great moral crisis”128 within society. 
Along similar lines, the monograph Les Doctrines de haine, by the well-known rational historian 
Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and published in 1902 claimed that “the Dreyfus Affair is responsible for 
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the moral crisis which traverses France.”129 Clearly, a sense of moral catastrophe was emerging with-
in the minds of contemporaries. Comparably, the work, Les Preuves: Affaire Dreyfus, by French 
socialist leader Jean Jaurès, claimed the affair had been responsible for the present “degradation” 
in France and, therefore, responsible for France‟s “supreme crisis.”130 Commenting on the heinous 
acts of the officers in the army, the exposé, L‟Affaire Dreyfus: Tout le crime, referred to the offic-
ers as “the authors of this crime.” The author, Joseph Reinach, writer, politician, and admirer of 
the famous secularist Léon Gambetta, calls Esterhazy “the loony Robespierre” and claims that he 
and his kind “have caused genuine inquietude and anxious uncertainty” in France.131 Many of these 
works published by Dreyfusards refer to the “despotic” generals and army members as both 
“Catholics” and “Christians.”132 Perhaps ironically, traditional Christianity began to emerge in gen-
eral discourse as a reactionary force responsible the cause of a specific type of moral uncertainty 
within France.  
These sentiments led to the rise of a new imagined threat to France: the “Catholic fanatic.” 
According to anticlerical contemporary Henri la Soudiar, “The Dreyfus Affair is not a miscarriage 
of justice, but a conscious and premeditated crime: the crime of clericalism and anti-Semitism.” 
Also discussed is the “current crisis” that found “the French nation unconsciously drowned in a 
deep moral lapse that explains and characterizes it.”133 The work L'Affaire Dreyfus et ses ressorts 
secrets: Précis historique, by famous novelist and politician Paschal Grousset, claimed that “There 
is a presumption of injustice in the covert summary execution of the Jewish officer by the ministry 
of war and the Catholic fury…This crime has deeply troubled the national conscience. It has un-
leashed a ruinous tempest on France.” It also asserted, “religion is a prodigious instrument of rule, 
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which crushes the seeds of all revolution, repeals all rights, enslaves the conscience, and humiliates 
the conscience. In regards to the “Catholic, royalist” nature of the army, the work contended, 
“When we forge armies in such a way it is for a purpose. It is to crush the French Revolution, to 
replace it and the ruins of the modern world…establishing the rule of a State where the Christian 
priest be all, where the individual will be nothing.” It consistently invokes the evils of the “Catholic, 
royalist army” and claimed the idea that “every Jew is a traitor. Every Jew must be crushed like a 
venomous beast” was “pure royalist, Catholic doctrine.”134 Furthermore, the work Vers la lu-
mière...impressions vécues: Affaire Dreyfus, by the French feminist and socialist Séverine (Caro-
line Rémy de Guebhard), maintained that the Dreyfus Affair was triggered by “Catholics.” It con-
tinues to argue that Catholic “anti-Semitism” was “the doctrine of hate, destroyer of progress, „a 
danger for the Republic.”135 The Dreyfus Affair inspired left-wing journalists and writers to associate 
Christianity with “doctrines of hate,” France‟s despotic past, and reactionary politics which inhibit-
ed progress. The division between “reactionary” Catholics and “progressive” secularists caused a 
deep sense of rupture, moral confusion, and uncertainty within France. 
The association of Catholics with the ancien regime and counter-enlightenment principles 
during the Dreyfus Affair continued to influence debates over the Law of Separation a few years 
later. An article in Le Matin from October 1904 stated, “The present political regime is inspired by 
the emancipatory principles of the revolution and free from dogmatic input and is pressing towards 
intellectualism and rationality. Clericalism has always stood against the Republic as an implacable 
enemy…the law (of separation) is called upon to rescue us from any fanaticism and ignorance in 
the country.” The article supported the act of “undermining religion” due to the fact that “religious 
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power has denied the rights” of the French people since the establishment of the Concordant.136 
When the law passed in 1905, many contemporaries perceived it as a rational, progressive move. 
An article in Le Matin claimed exuberantly, “the Concordat is no more.” It continued to state that, 
“this venerable monument (the Concordat) which had arbitrated the official religion of France” was 
to be replaced with “a law truly worthy of a secular republic…henceforth, no vestiges of the old 
state religion remains, it recognizes no religion…all are equal before the law.” It asserts that the law 
will be effective “against religious fanatics,” leaving the French people to “carefully roll abolished 
deities in the purple shroud of sleeping, dead gods.”137 The cultural and political sway of these “fa-
natical” Catholics and their public displays of religion seemed to be on the wane within French so-
ciety. 
The Dreyfus Affair led to a demonization of Catholics within public discourse, minimized 
the political power of the right, and circuitously led to the passing of the Law of Separation in 
1905. For many, France was progressing and modernizing beyond the influence of reactionary, 
monarchical Catholics. However, a sense of moral degeneracy and confusion continued to signifi-
cantly pervade the metropolitan population, both Catholic and unaffiliated alike. 
Catholic works pointed to this idea of a moral and religious breakdown in France after the 
Law of Separation. Importantly, we must understand that the law was by no means attempting to 
rid France of religion. Rather, it was implemented to relegate religious conviction to individuals‟ 
private lives in favor of public peace. However, the interpretation that the separation caused France 
to lose a fundamental aspect of its identity remained common in early twentieth-century rhetoric. 
The Catholic work Contre la séparation, by Albert de Mun, stated, “The rupture of the French 
government with the Church, the separation between the Church and state, constitutes the crucial 
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happening of our times…France is in an uncertain, precarious, and sad position.” It continues, 
“some call it (the law) the intellectual and social emancipation of the nation, others will see that is 
will cause moral decay and national abasement. But without even addressing this debate, 
acknowledge the fact that the separation of Church and state is France's official apostasy.”138 Even 
though the law wasn‟t eliminating religion, contemporary reactions suggest that, for some Catholics, 
the separation was of great and detrimental significance to their religious lives. These notions re-
verberated in the monograph Après la séparation: Suivi du texte de la loi concernant la séparation 
des Églises et de l'État, by the moderate right writer and politician Gabriel-Paul-Othenin d' Haus-
sonville. D' Haussonville stated, “the ambiguities and inconsistencies of the law explain and justify 
the abundant uncertainties which currently shape Catholic points of view.”139 An article published 
in Le Matin emphasizes the uncertainty as well. It stated, “this nation that was previously called the 
eldest daughter of the Church in regards to religion is now an object of sadness, grave concern, and 
anxiety.”140 While the Law of Separation was implemented first and foremost to privatize religion, it 
is clear that contemporary Catholics perceived it as something more resembling apostasy than reli-
gious interiorization. France‟s role as “eldest daughter of the Church,” despite over a century of 
revolution and increasing secularization, had continued to hold ideological sway for France‟s Cath-
olics. 
While it was understandable for Catholics to have felt a sense of unease, more widely read, 
religiously unaffiliated sources also mimicked these ideas as well. An article in the daily Le Temps 
worried over the nature of the Law of Separation. It stated, “by definition, the rupture will result in 
greater liberty for both spouses (the state and the Church). However, the rupture of the concordant 
union will not have this effect. The state will be cleared of its obligations to the Catholic Church. 
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But the latter will not recover its rights from the hands of the state—most notably it will not gain its 
independence. Why? Because the state will not be willing or able to ignore a force as considerable 
as the Catholic Church…This will lead to a new arbitrariness that will not be limited by the pleasure 
of the majority.” It continues, “we are passing from a stable regime to a regime based on the whims 
of the highest bidder.”141 Apparently, a fear that France was lapsing into incertitude and falling un-
der the rule of an arbitrary government existed among the populace. The separation of the former 
“spouses” carried momentous consequences even for the religiously unaffiliated. And, as with all 
divorce, while the eventual results might be positive, gaping wounds remain for years.  
France‟s populace lost an integral part of its complex identity after 1905. By minimizing 
(though not extinguishing) France‟s traditional and eminent role as “eldest daughter of the 
Church,” the French government diminished a fundamental characteristic of French culture that 
had contributed to the country‟s international prestige for centuries.142 An article from Le Matin in 
1906 highlights this notion. The article states, “1906 finishes in sorrow and 1907 begins with anxie-
ty. There has been, in reality, the total collapse of one society and we lack the ability to create a 
new one…never have I seen such a series of dark events… The good French men who had been 
attached to the traditions which made France glorious never found themselves…so low.”143 This 
passage reiterates the notion that, not only had France‟s relationship with the Catholic Church 
made it “glorious” in a secure, more illustrious past, but it also demonstrates that the law caused a 
noteworthy crack in French society. The work La Crise de la République, published a few years 
later in 1914, repeated similar sentiments. It claimed, “the Individual Frenchman has not lost the 
physical and intellectual qualities of his race, but the nation is no longer governed by morality. It 
seems to overlook the purpose of moral greatness and power which further elevates people by ex-
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citing their energies. This is evil.”144 While the “Frenchman” continued to thrive physically and in-
tellectually, France had lost its formerly perceived sense of moral greatness. The author of the text, 
J.L. de Lanessan, a self-identified “liberal” who was not necessarily opposed to the separation, still 
maintained the crucial role the “high Catholic cultural ideal” had played in France when the rela-
tionship between the Church and state had existed. Also important is the fact that he questioned 
the State‟s ability to replace the Church‟s role in society. However, Lanessan affirmed that, “de-
spite these political differences that divide them (the Catholics and secularists), they must unite and 
make every effort to…raise the moral greatness of this country.”145 Judging by these sources, feelings 
of division and moral lapse permeated France in the years leading up to World War I. This epoch 
in French history was defined by societal and religious schism, echoing the Durkheimeian notion 
that “the old gods are growing old or already dead, and others are not yet born.” This reality 
caused a “state of incertitude and agitation” in France.146  
This sense of a fractured French identity in relation to religion, belief, and morality left 
France in a state of ideological limbo. Perceived breaks with a (reactionary) Catholic past coupled 
with the sense that enlightened progress (no matter how liberating) was unable to fill the cultural 
void left by the separation landed French society in a precarious position.
147
 Judging by early twenti-
eth-century language, the Law of Separation and the subsequent privatization of religion were mo-
mentous events: the equivalent of apostasy for many Catholics and a jolting experience on a soci-
ocultural level for the religiously unaffiliated. So, while the increased fanaticisation of Catholics in 
public discourse surrounding the Dreyfus Affair and the Law of 1905 made it increasingly unpopu-
lar to be associated with Christianity in public rhetoric, discourse surrounding the fight for Moroc-
co explicitly identified France with “Christianity” and “the Christian world” as if France‟s “Christi-
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anity” was something inherent and understood. How is this feasible? Because French society found 
itself in a state of confusion in regards to religion and morality, French journalists, government offi-
cials, and other public figures began to imbue “French Christianity” with new meaning—tying 
France to its more illustrious past and assuring its connections to a progressive, enlightened, secu-
lar future. Morocco provided a space in which to create a new secular Christian identity that incor-
porated both of these associations.  
 
4.3 Fanaticism, Rationality, and the New “French Christianity” 
The Third Republic‟s brand of secular morality was initially intended to replace Catholi-
cism in the hearts and minds of the French populace.
148
 However, the Law of Separation was not 
meant to rid France of all religious (Catholic) observance. As stated earlier, French government 
officials intended to relegate religious practice to the private sphere. Despite the fact that the Drey-
fus Affair and the Law of Separation caused a sense of loss and instability within France in relation 
to French identity, contemporary rhetoric surrounding the debates over the law suggests that, for 
many religiously unaffiliated French people, the promise of religious privatization was one of the 
most celebrated and anticipated aspects of the Law of 1905.  
In For the Soul of France, Frederick Brown cites a late nineteenth-century petition from 
“The New Education Society” regarding the division between the public and private sectors. 
Brown quotes, “Liturgical objects and religious images should be removed from public view. Nei-
ther prayers, nor dogma, nor anything that pertains to the individual conscience should be taught 
or practiced in common.” The only method that was to hold sway was “the experimental or scien-
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tific, which is based on facts, whatever their nature—physical, moral, intellectual.149 Unmistakably, 
religion, a symbol of France‟s reactionary past, was to be a private affair whereas science, a marker 
of modernity and progress, was much more acceptable to discuss in public forums. Similarly, the 
work Précis de morale, by secularist Emile Rayot, asserted, “the state, in the interest of public or-
der, to defend against violations of justice, to protect the rights of individuals,” enacted the Law of 
Separation to “ensure the freedom of each and maintains the rights of private initiative which is 
one of the most valuable sources of public wealth, it also seems to truly meet the collective inter-
est.”150 According to the author, the individual‟s “private initiative” to practice religion ensured the 
freedom of the French people. Such accounts consistently identified religious interiorization with 
freedom and liberty for the majority, insinuating that the public exercise of religion proved stifling 
in the minds of many contemporaries.  
Fortunately for such persons, the Law of Separation encouraged the privatization of reli-
gion from a legal perspective. The minutes from the debates over the law that took place from 
1904 to 1905, titled La Séparation: Discussion de la loi, declared, “If the sentiment is found in 
France for people wanting to create a new religion, they can form an association of individuals to 
practice their religion in private meetings, but when they open a place of worship in public, they 
will need to form any association declared according prescriptions sixteen and seventeen under 
title four.”151 Prescriptions sixteen and seventeen outlined what was allowed and not allowed to be 
place on the exteriour of religious buildings in France. I cite these details to demonstrate that, 
though religion was not being outlawed or forbidden within French society, public representations 
of religious observance were most certainly discouraged after 1905. Similarly, the pro-separation 
monograph Apres la séparation, by René Lavollée, outlined the parameters placed on the public 
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display of religious symbols. The work explains that there was to be “no religious symbols on pub-
lic monuments or in any public place whatsoever, except for buildings used for worship, burial 
grounds in cemeteries, monuments and museums or exhibitions.” It elaborates on the strict regula-
tions placed on religious images in the civic sphere, “associations formed for… the public exercise 
of worship shall be in accordance with the following articles…”152 We can gather from reading these 
texts that symbols of religion or religious observance were, if not eradicated from, then at least dis-
couraged in French public life after the Law of Separation. Religion was meant to be the exclusive 
business of the faithful, not the preoccupation of the French state or its general populace. 
A lecture given by Léon Duguit at a school for social studies in 1907 titled Le Régime du 
culte Catholique antérieur à la loi de séparation et les causes juridiques de la séparation: Confé-
rence faite à l'École des Hautes Études Sociales, gives an alternative perspective on the privatiza-
tion of religion. Although the Catholic author is “Glad that „discord and strife‟” will end with the 
enactment of the law, he admitted, “I cannot force myself to believe that the result will be a regime 
of stable equilibrium in which religion, now a thing of the private conscience, has become quite 
alien to the political life of the country…and all believers will worship freely and practice their faith 
under the protection of an impartial and neutral state.”153 Although Duguit was against the idea of 
separation, his lecture enables us to better understand contemporary notions surrounding the law. 
While his speech allows us to see the (negative) results Catholics expected from religious privatiza-
tion, it also reveals the emphasis placed on the interiorization of religion in discussions surround-
ing the law. Duguit‟s speech also shows that contemporaries hoped that relegating Christianity to 
an exclusively private sphere of influence would bring an end to the discord and strife that had 
characterized French life for decades. 
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Newspapers widely read by the general populace also proclaimed that, because public reli-
gion had led only to division and moral crisis in France, the Law of Separation would result in an 
unprecedented “freedom of conscience” on an individual level. An article in Le Matin in 1906 
claimed, “democratic and liberal sentiments are so entrenched, and the country has shown recently 
in the general elections that…the triumph of secularism and freedom of conscience will be the out-
come of this struggle with the Church”154 Similarly, an additional article from 1906 asserted that the 
law “proclaims the freedom of conscience, the secularization of the state and of life.” It continues 
to state that the relationship between the French state and the Catholic Church had “condemned 
all free spirits in the depths of their consciences” and that intellectual freedom would result with 
the expulsion of public religion.
155
 Contemporary newspapers are littered with similar sentiments. 
Clearly, the separation between the Church and the state and the privatization of religious symbols 
and practice would result in a greater freedom of conscience for the French majority. After receiv-
ing extremely bad press in regards to the Dreyfus Affair, Catholicism—and its supposed reaction-
ary, monarchial, anti-enlightenment political leanings—seemed best exercised within the private 
consciences‟ of expressed believers. Despite the moral confusion and sense of rupture caused by 
the Law of Separation, it seems the majority of the French (Catholics included), believed that a 
public disassociation with religion would lead to public peace.  
However, French discourse surrounding Morocco complicates this picture in that language 
used by the secular media and government publically identified the French as “Christians” in rela-
tion to the Muslims of the North African country. The secularists‟ references to “Christianity” in-
dicate the beginnings of a cultural progression within French public discourse. By placing typically 
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“secular,” “scientific,” and “enlightened” ideals under the moniker “Christian” in the Moroccan 
context, French public figures and writers began to (consciously or subconsciously) imbue the con-
cept of “French Christianity” with new meaning. In this context, Christianity was used as an appel-
lation to indicate a deep cultural superiority over a religious inferior and not as an indication of a 
national return to a higher deity after the Law of Separation. As metropolitan France staggered un-
der the weight of religious change and perceived moral dissolution, Morocco provided a space in 
which to refashion a unified, enlightened Christian front, establishing solidarity in a desperate mo-
ment within French religious life.  
As stated in chapter one, the primacy of religion within Moroccan culture resulted in the 
Moroccan people initially characterizing the French as “Christians.” In fact, a government-
sponsored publication, Affaires du Maroc 1910-1912, published by the Ministère des Affaires 
Étrangères, criticized the Moroccans for placing importance on religious identity at the expense of 
European nationalism. The work complains that the Moroccans, “excited by fanaticism,” had not 
made any distinction of nationality…Moreover, they hardly know the name of the main European 
nations and confuse us all under the name Christian.
156
 Not only does this quote underline the Mo-
roccans‟ lack of knowledge about the “nation” that was so crucial to French conceptions of moder-
nity, it also might suggest that it was the Moroccans, not the French, who often associated France 
(wrongly) with Christianity. However, not only does this particular article accept the label, but also, 
during the later years of the Belle Époque, it is apparent that French media and public figures 
adopted this discourse and attempted to utilize it for their own purposes. Contemporary media 
and government reports suggest that “French Christianity” was employed by the religiously unaffili-
ated to connect France to its high, illustrious Catholic past while simultaneously connecting the 
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French populace to enlightened rationality and scientific reasoning in regard to the Moroccan 
populace.  
This “secular Christianity” emerged within discourse regarding the “irrational fanaticism” of 
the Moroccans in direct comparison to the “rationality” of the French Christians. An earlier publi-
cation of the bulletin Affaires du Maroc: 1901-1905 states, “It is only the hate of the Christian 
which guides our adversaries.” According to the document, even military setbacks or failures, “cer-
tainty do not diminish the fanaticism” of the Moroccans.157 The work also addresses the state of 
French reform work in Morocco. The attempts of “Christian France” to bring Moroccan society 
into modernity excited “the fanaticism of the Moroccan population…against French…Christians.”158 
In this passage, French Christians are portrayed as rational carriers of enlightenment and scientific 
improvement while the Muslims are irrationally religious and fanatical.  
In the government bulletin, L'Organisation financière de l'Empire Marocain we find com-
parable language. Referring to the general culture of Moroccan insurrection against the French, the 
work asserts, “in Morocco, in serious circumstances—particularly when the country is flooded by 
Christians—if the Sultan proclaimed a Holy War (Jihad) he is sure to receive the dedicated support 
of his subjects.” The work goes on to state, “religious initiation causes a Muslim child to suddenly 
become fanatical, full of foolish pride and believing that he possesses the absolute truth, happily 
demonstrating his inferiority. This is the foolish pride of radical Muslim vice.”159 Although this 
work does not go into explicit detail regarding the character and actions of the French Christians, 
the implicit contrast between the Christians and Muslims suggests that the Moroccans‟ belief in ab-
solute religious truth rendered them inferior. The Christians “flooding” the country are clearly as-
sumed to be of a more rational, scientific variety.  
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Additionally, the vignette, La Renaissance du Maroc: Dix ans de protectorat, 1912-1922, a 
work published by the Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc in 1922, upholds 
this idea of Muslim fanaticism. The work, intending to sum up France‟s imperial experience in 
Morocco in the first decade of the protectorate, consistently referring to the Moroccans as ““vio-
lent” “savage” and “fanatical in their subconscious lives.” The work states, “We must guard against 
Islamicized and Arabized natives, who today oppose our valiant troops with resistance. They hate 
Christians” but, the work hopes, “perhaps one day they will become the strongest supporters of 
our domination.” 160 French writers associated France with a Christian identity in direct relation to 
Moroccan “religious fanatics.” Interestingly, these portrayals of Muslims as subordinate, unreason-
ing, and driven by mindless religious observance are not wholly unlike French portrayals of fervent 
Catholics within the metropole.  
Moroccan opposition to French “Christian” interference led to several rebellions over the 
first two decades of the twentieth century. Popular French newspapers covered these rebellions, 
playing up the dichotomy between Islam and Christianity for a general metropolitan audience. 
When Moulay Hafid‟s acension to the throne was announced in 1908, riots broke out in Fez, the 
capital city of Morocco. An article in Le Temps states that “the Moroccans accused him (the for-
mer sultan, Abdul Aziz) of acting under the inspiration of Christians and ceding to the French that 
which was not theirs.” After linking France with Christianity, the article asserts that “France, Mo-
rocco‟s neighbor, needs to impose order on anarchic feudalism in Morocco…which is always syn-
onymous with disorder.” It continues to discuss the riot, referring to the Moroccans as “xenopho-
bic,” “anarchic,” and “largely ignorant.” The rioters who were “accusing Abdul Aziz of selling Mo-
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rocco to Christians,” were “troublemakers who fomented the recent riot.”161 Even though Catholics 
within the metropole were condemned in wider metropolitan discourse for their reactionary reli-
gious and political views in the early twentieth century, French Christians in the Moroccan context 
were implored to impose republican order on a feudalistic, ignorant society supposedly dominated 
by religious sentiment.  
A few years later, as the new Moroccan sultan, Moulay Hafid, signed Morocco over to 
France in 1912, a journalist asserted that, “the resentment against French Christians increased.” 
The article, appearing in the center of the front page of Le Temps, refers to the Moroccans as fa-
natic “mutineers” blinded by their religious hatred. However, “those who know Morocco declare 
that the country is able to rise (to the level of civilization). These individuals, whose authority is 
great in this matter, must be included so that France can institute in Morocco a regime of clarity 
and enlightenment.The people must feel the benefits of our action. If these benefits are not im-
posed on the spirit of the population, France‟s actions risk remaining sterile.”162 In this context, the 
French Christians, harbingers of clarity and enlightenment, are beseeched to raise the Moroccans 
above their religious fanaticism and impose rationality and order within the new protectorate or 
risk becoming ineffective. By linking France to its high, superior Christian past and its modern ca-
pabilities to civilize (and even secularize) the Moroccan mindset, this article demonstrates a new, 
rhetorical meaning behind “French Christianity” in regards to Morocco‟s colonial population. 
Furthermore, newspaper coverage of the 1912 massacre in Fez suggests that the moniker 
“Christian” was being used to voice more secular, rational ideals. The article, published in Le Mat-
in in 1912, contended that, while French “Christians” had come to Fez to bring “peace and tran-
quility” to Morocco, the jihadist leaders‟ “effective propaganda” against the Christians turned even 
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the most trustworthy Moroccans against France. The article continues, “some of the (Moroccan) 
tribes came to tell us that…they were obligated to march against us in order to evade being massa-
cred.”163 This passage, though not without a certain amount of sympathy, nevertheless depicts the 
Muslims as malleable and lacking free thought and individuality. The Moroccans, forced to con-
form to the will of God and their earthly superiors at the point of a sword, stand in stark contrast to 
the French Christians, who seem dumbfounded by the Moroccan‟s lack of personal agency in the 
matter. 
The French media also associated this secular “Christian” civilization with humanitarian 
sentiment. An article published in Le Temps in 1912 discussed the nature of religion and society 
in Morocco among other topics. The editorial described Moroccan Muslims as “fanatical” and 
claimed that they “observe their religion with more severity than other peoples.” It continued to 
discuss the sad plight of the “poor, small Moroccan refugees” who survived the rebellion in Fez. 
The editorial concludes that, although the French people might have been tempted to sympathize 
with the “large, somber eyes” of the Moroccans affected by France‟s reprisals, “in reality, the Chris-
tian is always abhorred by these fanatics.”164 In this article, French Christianity is represented as an 
identity based on rationality as well as a controlled, superior sentimentality. Although the French 
Christians might have been lured into feeling sympathy for the destitute, they are clearly not subject 
to the severe, violent fanaticism characteristic of the Moroccan Muslims. Again, this language em-
ployed to demean the Moroccans was not unlike the contemporary portrayals of devout French 
Catholics cited above. These discursive similarities indicate that Christianity in the Moroccan con-
text was employed to highlight France‟s rational, ethical civilization rather than religious devotion.  
                                                          
163
 Jules Madeline, “Les Attaques des tribus contre Fez,” Le Matin, May 31, 1912.  
164
 Adrien Hébrard “La Vie a Paris,” Le Temps, April 26,1912.  
76 
 
Often, unaffiliated government officials and writers associated “French Christians” explicitly 
with enlightenment ideals. Despite asserting that “France” was “slowly coming out of the „age of 
religion,‟” the monograph, Un Programme de politique coloniale: Les Questions indigenes by an-
ticlericalist Louis Vignon, makes dozens of references to “French Christians” when discussing the 
peoples of the Muslim world. While Vignon claimed, “little by little, the scientific movement is 
delivering it…France offers the premier example of a people who, in sum and en masse, practice 
free thought,” he continued to associate the people of France with Christianity. He stated, “France 
has large colonial holdings over the Islamic world, where an opposition to Christianity exists 
among the Muslims.” Vignon upholds this association throughout the work, making staments such 
as, “In France‟s colonial endeavors, it is found that Christianity and Islam clash.”165 Additionally, 
the work asserts that non-European, inferior peoples “cannot comprehend the religion of Christ” 
and, these “Muslims…have a disregard for antecedents and a lack of moral unity.” Paradoxically, 
Vignon condemns “inferior” peoples (particularly Muslims) for lacking the ability to comprehend 
the Christian religion while at the same time extolling the French people‟s increased secularism, 
libre pensée, and their ability to place value on scientific rather than religious truth.
166
 
The idea of France as a “Christian state” also continued to exercise influence within French 
colonial rhetoric. The non-religious study, Précis de sociologie nord-africaine by A.G.P. Martin, 
discusses the mindset of the Moroccan peoples from a French perspective, stating that, “from a 
Muslim point of view, the sovereign cannot accept the political tutelage of a Christian state without 
losing prestige.” While Martin identifies France as a Christian state, he is clearly not referring to 
the collective French populace‟s childlike faith and collective religious devotion, for he continues 
to associate French Christianity with more “secular” values throughout the work. “We have already 
                                                          
165
 Louis Vignon, Un Programme de politique coloniale: Les Questions indigenes (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1919), 
409, 415, 565. 
166
 Ibid, 159, 565. 
77 
 
seen that the character of Islam does violence to reason. Their reasoning abilities are relatively low, 
since there is only one mystery, the existence of God.” Additionally, he elucidates on “the cohesive 
forces of Islam” that “establish mental uniformity among its followers.” This cohesiveness results in 
“the common interests of the religious and social group” becoming “aggressive and disturbing” to 
the French. He concludes with a call for reform: “all the groups of the Muslim community” must 
“regain their liberty, and, each accountable for himself, try to be resigned in submission to avoid 
greater damage.”167 While stating that these Muslims must put aside their collective religious devo-
tion in favor of the individual, free thought associated with progress and modernity, he clearly still 
maintains that they must remain submissive to the rule of the (Christian) French state. 
Comparably, the monograph Chrétiens et musulmans: Voyages et études, by progressive 
author Ludovic de Contenson, claimed that Muslims “hated Christians,” that is, “modern civiliza-
tion.” The work, having linked Christianity with innovation and development, continues, “the Mus-
lims hate Christians not only because they are infidels” according to Koranic law, but because they 
are “capitalists” “conquerors” “engineers” and “the masters of tomorrow.”168 These descriptions of 
the “French Christians” link them with processes of modernity and an innate superiority that dif-
fered greatly from descriptions of Catholics within the metropole.  
The Moroccan penchant for rebellious, religious warfare served to highlight the rationality 
of enlightened French Christianity. The work, La Conquête du Maroc; La Question indigene, by 
French government official and lecturer René Millet, similarly claimed that the Moroccans so long 
“removed from civilization,” should “graciously accept the foreign yoke within the rebellious, tur-
bulent, fanatical ancient city of Fez, which...has been long inaccessible to Christians.” Now that 
France had gained access to the Islamic stronghold however, the French people had “received the 
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mission to spread among them our civilization,” and “fight the lasciviousness and misery found” 
within Moroccan culture.
169
 Regarding the rebellious nature of the Moroccans, the monograph stat-
ed that, “undoubtedly, the religious reaction which followed the appearance of Christians…would 
bring attention to Fez, the holy city of Islam.” Nevertheless, “French institutions will penetrate Mo-
roccan disorder” until “the (backwards) instincts of the natives are presented with liberty.” For, the 
author asserted, France‟s “queen is named Reason” and the French nation is “not without gran-
deur…if we consider the intellectual progress France has made as well as its progress in its external 
(colonial) endeavors.”170 The Christian penetration of the Islamic holy places would lead to in-
creased civilization and productivity within Morocco. The great people of France, identifying with 
their traditional Christian identity while simultaneously submitting to the progressive rule of “Rea-
son,” would bring liberty to the Muslims of Morocco.  
Similarly, the minutes from a 1910 meeting of the colonial lobbyist group, L‟Union Colo-
nial Française, titled, L'Islam et la colonisation de l'Afrique: Conférence faite sous le patronage de 
l'Union Coloniale Française, claimed that “experience has proved a thousand times that adherents 
to Islam are lost to the Christian religion.” While “Islam responds to a spirit of discipline,” it does 
not “guarantee the free thought of modern civilization or the morality of enlightened Christianity.” 
The minutes also record the statement, “the interest of the metropole should prevail always and 
everywhere.” And, while “the metropole does not have the least interest in the religion…of the in-
digenous peoples, the modern state favors the formation of strong Christian groups (among the 
colonized populations), not for any religious or sentimental reasons, but for reasons of state. This 
is possible without great difficulty, because…it is evident that Christianity is superior by the very fact 
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that it is practiced by the superior race.”171 Although this quotation does not explicitly address Mo-
rocco, the idea of a “religionless Christianity” emerges in relation to Islamic North Africa. Lobby-
ists utilized this secularized, enlightened brand of “Christianity” to demonstrate France‟s moral and 
civilizational superiority and mused over whether it might be used to better control Muslim popu-
lations in North Africa.  
Even government meetings were filled with conversations about the status of “French 
Christians” in Morocco. Minutes from the Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord, held in Paris on Octo-
ber 6, 1908, stated that the Moroccan populace was “vehemently against the Christians.” The con-
gress continued to ponder this notion, stating, “However, if it were really a hatred of all Christians, 
without distinction of origin, dictated by unique religious motives, all would be rejected with the 
same disapproval.” In the Moroccan population, however, “only the French” Christians were held 
in defiance. “Their skillful legends represent the French people as tyrants and oppressors.” Their 
“preventions are based on more than religious enthusiam…when they fight against the possible in-
tervention of our troops. Certainly, religious enthusiasm exists amongst the Moroccans, but it 
would be a mistake to believe that is the cornerstone of their general hostility…particularly against 
the French.” While these passages give the Moroccan people slightly more agency and depict them 
as more than religious fanatics (perhaps they had political and cultural reasons for rejecting French 
rule!), this work demonstrates that French government officials continued to associate France 
overtly with a Christian identity even after the Law of Separation. Although “it would be humiliat-
ing for the Moroccans to be governed by Christians,” a French-ruled Morocco would, “allow the 
natives to participate in the work of progress and justice, which will be fulfilled around them.” The 
work then claims, “we can conceive the creation of a modern Muslim University where, light of 
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Western science will train a new generation…more apt…to appreciate the civilizing mission of 
France.”172 Judging by this language, although the French identified themselves as Christians in rela-
tion to the Moroccans, there existed no religious-based ambitions to spread the Christian gospel 
but an ambition to civilize and spread progressive, enlightenment values amongst the backwards, 
unenlightened population.  
Indubitably, a French Christian identity was diffused with new nuance and meaning. By 
comparing the Islamic, Moroccan fanatics to the rational, enlightened French Christians after the 
Law of Separation, French journalists, government officials, and other public figures and groups 
demonstrated that what it meant to be French and Christian was changing in public rhetoric. By 
invoking ideas of France‟s illustrious Christian past in a time of religious and political instability, 
French public figures created a sense of solidarity amongst their divided metropolitan constituents. 
However, by highlighting “Christian” France‟s scientific and civilizational achievements, these indi-
viduals‟ language suggests that “French Christianity” was referring to a superior, enlightened France 
(not a devout, Catholic France) in the Moroccan context.  
Emile Durkheim stated in 1912, “There can be no society which does not feel the need of 
upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas 
which make its unity and its personality.”173 After the turmoil caused by the Dreyfus Affair and the 
sense of sociocultural rupture caused by the secularization of France and the privatization of reli-
gion in 1905, France‟s “Christian” identity in relation to the supposed inferior, irrational inhabit-
ants of Morocco provided an space in which the French could draw on both past and present glo-
ry. In so doing, the French media, government, and other public figures upheld certain “collective 
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sentiments” which appealed to both Catholic and unaffiliated French men and women in the years 
leading up to World War I. 
 
EPILOGUE 
French historian Sarah Maza once stated, “Who we are as social beings is shaped by the 
constant messages we receive about whom to desire and whom to despise.”174 Nowhere is this 
statement more applicable than when discussing France‟s colonial relations with Morocco, where 
interactions between the colonizing power and the colonized peoples both shaped and reflected a 
fluctuating metropolitan French religious identity in the turbulent first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. Through an examination of how the French press, government, and other public figures 
molded what it meant to be “desirable” or “detrimental” to French society, this thesis demonstrates 
that desirability was a fluid concept depending heavily on race, ethnicity, and religious identity. 
One hundred years after the Law of Separation, “desirability” within France remains equal-
ly capricious. On March 15, 2004, the French government passed a statute prohibiting the wearing 
of “conspicuous signs” of religious affiliation in public schools. Article 1 states,  
In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of signs or clothing 
which conspicuously manifest students‟ religious affiliations is prohibited. Discipli-
nary procedures to implement this rule will be preceded by a discussion with the 
student. 
 
An explanation of “conspicuous” accompanies this article: 
The clothing and religious signs prohibited are conspicuous signs such as a large 
cross, a veil, or a skullcap. Not regarded as signs indicating religious affiliation are 
discreet signs, which can be, for example, medallions, small crosses, stars of David, 
hands of Fatima, or small Korans.
175
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Despite the fact that this law applied to all explicit signs of religion, it was aimed primarily at Mus-
lim girls wearing headscarves. According to Joan Wallach Scott in her work, The Politics of the 
Veil, “the headscarf or, as it was soon to be referred to almost exclusively, the veil (voile), was con-
sidered inimical to French custom and law because it violated the separation of Church and state, 
insisted on differences among citizens in a nation one and indivisible, and accepted the subordina-
tion of women in a republic premised on equality. For many supporters of the law, the veil was the 
ultimate symbol of Islam‟s resistance to modernity.”176 
The idealization of nationalism has taken on many forms within various national histories. 
In France, it has taken the form of an insistence on the ideals of the republic, supposed to be the 
principles of the Enlightenment in their preeminent, most enduring form. According to Scott, 
“This image of France is mythical; its power and appeal rests, to a large degree, on its negative por-
trayal of Islam. The objectification of Muslims as a fixed „culture‟ has its counterpart in the my-
thologizing of France as an enduring „republic.‟ Both are imagined to lie outside of history—
antagonists locked in eternal combat.”177 However, a closer examination of the French people‟s 
(discursive and literal) interactions with the Muslims of Morocco in the first few decades of the 
twentieth century demonstrates that not only do French republicanism and the “immutable cul-
ture” of the Islamic world share a weighty and interconnected history, but also that history has had 
a fundamental impact on the ways in which the French have defined themselves internally and in-
ternationally in the twentieth century.  
Far from being an incontrovertibly secular republic since 1905, France continued be identi-
fied with Catholicism, albeit in a more temporally infused form. Supporting this notion, Joan Scott 
asserts in Politics of the Veil that even in the twenty-first century, critics of laïcité claim that it is not 
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a universal concept at all, but is rather “intimately bound up with the dominant Catholic religious 
culture of the nation.”178 It is this current perception that has led me to argue that, after 1905, the 
concept of a “Christian” France not only resonated with people in their private consciences, but 
continued to fundamentally define what it meant to be truly French in public rhetoric. 
I have aspired to contextualize and consider twentieth-century French religious identity in 
light of France‟s imperial endeavors. According to Kevin J. Callahan and Sarah A. Curtis in their 
work Views from the Margins: Creating Identities in Modern France, “the core/periphery frame-
work allows us to investigate the salient features of modern French identity in multiple ways.”179 Re-
ligious evolution in twentieth-century France did not occur within an ideological bubble. There-
fore, it is essential to understand French religious trajectories in light of the French populace‟s in-
teractions with colonial peoples, for not only did the periphery “permit more fluid and dynamic 
notions of identity,” but peripheral developments also had the power to “drastically upset or 
change identity patterns emanating from Paris or the center.”180 In response to this historiographical 
call, I have combined and complicated two established bodies of historical literature: the historiog-
raphy of religion and laïcité in France and the historiography of French colonialism. While both of 
these areas shed light on the nature of empire and religion in pre-War France, it is in their overlap 
where the most interesting and revealing intricacies exist concerning French identity. As debates 
over the role of religion in a secularized French society continue to influence public affairs into the 
twenty-first century, I believe examining the contradictions inherent in the master narratives of 
French religion over the last century prove more crucial than ever. For, according to Scott, “the 
attribution of inferior otherness…was attached to the veil, and beyond it to everything Muslim, Ar-
ab, and North African. The headscarf law, then, was not so much a solution to a problem as a 
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symptom of France‟s inability or unwillingness to face…the continuing power imbalance based on 
ethnic/religious difference—that has characterized its dealings with North Africans for so long.”181 
Religion continues to influence both French government policy and views towards supposed reli-
gious and racial inferiors and, as a result, must be allotted a central position in the historical analy-
sis and understanding of twentieth-century French cultural and political life.  
In an attempt to contribute to this conversation, my thesis shows that, while religious devo-
tion seemed to be on the wane within France in the early twentieth century, especially after the 
Dreyfus Affair and the passage of the 1905 Law of Separation, official rhetoric nevertheless con-
tinued to contrast a “Christian” France with an Islamic, even “savage” Morocco. Through a close 
examination of contemporary discourse, I have demonstrated that secular republicans and their 
Catholic counterparts shared similar ideals regarding morality, sexuality, and civilization in relation 
to France‟s Islamic colonies. Anxious about moral, sexual, and civilizational degeneracy within 
France and keen to characterize Moroccans as inferior to French civilization, French public figures 
of all ideological camps rallied around the banner of Christianity to evoke French ethical, cultural, 
and political superiority. Thus entangled, religion, morality, sexual prudence, and an innately supe-
rior and productive French civilization justified and legitimized the French imperial project. De-
spite the undeniable reality that the French—both secular and Catholic alike—were experiencing a 
period of religious and political upheaval in the metropole, Morocco provided a space in which 
these two groups were able to put aside their different ideals and principles and unite for the prolif-
icacy of French civilization. 
Not only was this discursively united metropolitan identity invoked in relation the people of 
Morocco, but France‟s post-1905 “Christian” identity also reflected and influenced the religious 
changes taking place back home. I have shown that secularists‟ references to “Christianity” in the 
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Moroccan context indicate the beginnings of a cultural trend within French public discourse. By 
placing typically secular, scientific, and enlightened ideals under the moniker “Christian” in the 
Moroccan context, French public figures and writers began to (consciously or subconsciously) in-
still the concept of “French Christianity” with new connotations. In this context, Christianity was 
used as a trope to indicate cultural superiority over religious inferiors and not as an indication of a 
national return to religious observance after the Law of Separation. As metropolitan France stum-
bled under the weight of religious change and perceived moral dissolution, Morocco provided a 
space in which to “refashion” a unified, enlightened Christian front, establishing solidarity in a des-
perate moment within French religious and cultural life. By analyzing the rhetorical interactions 
among French writers from a range of political and religious backgrounds, we are able to trace the 
contours and highlight the crucial interconnections between cultural practice and French imperial 
programs in the early twentieth century.  
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